The search for peace in Afghanistan : from buffer state to failed state /

This book should be read with its companion volume, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (CH, Sept'95), in spite of inevitable overlap and the conviction that one jargon-free volume would have sufficed. Rubin analyzes the failure of the international system (in which the US and Soviet Union, and hence the UN, are principals) to prevent the collapse of Afghanistan as a united state. From the Soviet invasion in 1979 to the Geneva Accords in April 1988 (which made clear the Soviets' intention to withdraw their armed forces), the US, Soviets, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait may have shoveled some $20 billion to their respective proxies. The US misinterpreted or ignored Soviet peace overtures. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1988, neither the US, Pakistan, nor the various mujahideen groups saw any reason to seek a political settlement. Rubin doubts that Afghanistan, even with the recent success of the Taliban, will ever again be a united state for several reasons: (1) the US and Europe no longer think its security imperative; (2) Russia's role has been reduced to merely supporting certain factions; (3) a united Afghanistan threatens the interests, stability, and legitimacy of its immediate neighbors; and (4) no group of factions sees a united Afghanistan as being in its interests unless its members were in control. Of interest to specialists of Central Asia or international relations. R. W. Olson; University of Kentucky