Review by Choice Review
This slim volume, a revised thesis, attempts to apply the theories of Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State, and War (1959) to an investigation of why Irag decided to invade Kuwait in 1990. Waltz proffers three theories for the causes of war: human nature and its propensity for war; the proclivities of an illiberal state to make war and the inability of even a liberal and democratic state to avoid war; and the international system, which exists in a state of anarchy ameliorated only by temporary balance-of-power strategies and alliances. Waltz concludes that an understanding and negotiation of all three theories might serve to limit war. Musallam concludes that Waltz's first theory applies to Iraq in that Saddam Hussein's evil nature played a crucial role in the decision to go to war. The second theory applies, since the authoritarian and police state structure of Iraq contributed to the decision to launch the war. The third theory, however, is only partially applicable: the alliance defeated the state, but not the leadership. The prosecution of the war by the allies also went considerably beyond the proportionality of "just war" criteria. This book adds nothing new to the literature on the Gulf War or to the theory of the origins of the war. The best book concerning the history and politics of Iraq as well as the origins of the Gulf War is Iraq: Power and Society, ed. by Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, and Thomas Koszinowski (CH, Oct'94). Not recommended. R. W. Olson University of Kentucky
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
