Seeing through self-deception /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Barnes, Annette.
Imprint:Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Description:x, 182 p. ; 23 cm.
Language:English
Series:Cambridge studies in philosophy.
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/2994081
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0521620147 (hardcover)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. 176-179) and index.
Review by Choice Review

Self-deception is a philosophically as well as a psychologically interesting phenomenon, and Barnes' text makes a worthwhile contribution to the growing body of literature surrounding this topic. What makes this work unique, however, is its depth and breadth. Though Barnes is clearly analytic in methodology, she manages to address the central epistemic issues surrounding self-deception while at the same time clarifying aspects of the underlying philosophy of mind and detailing relevant moral considerations. One of the most thought-provoking conclusions Barnes reveals is moral in nature: "If what has been said in this book about self-deception is correct--if epistemic bravery in the face of anxiety is required to avoid it--then being among the less deceived may very well be the best that most of us are able to achieve." This work is an excellent companion text to Alfred Mele's Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control (CH, Oct'87) and The Multiple Self, edited by Jon Elster (CH, Apr'87). Recommended for upper-division undergraduate and graduate students, faculty, and researchers. H. Storl; Augustana College (IL)

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review