Positive feedback economies /

Positive feedback economies /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Agliardi, E. (Elettra)
Imprint:New York : St. Martin's Press, 1998.
Description:ix, 154 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Statics and dynamics (Social sciences)
Uncertainty.
Externalities (Economics)
Externalities (Economics)
Statics and dynamics (Social sciences)
Uncertainty.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/3040557
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0312212488 (cloth)
Notes:"First published in Great Britain 1998 by Macmillan Press"--T.p. verso.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 141-151) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • List of Figures and Tables
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • 1. Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms and Complex Economic Dynamics
  • 1.1. Order and Disorder: the Economy as a Self-Organized System
  • 1.2. Uncertainty, Irreversibility and Increasing Returns
  • 1.3. Random Economies with Many Interacting Agents
  • 1.4. The Coevolution of Technologies, Conventions, Organizations and Institutions
  • 1.5. The Content of the Book
  • 2. Some Mathematics for Complex Economic Systems
  • 2.1. Dynamical Systems
  • 2.2. Bifurcations
  • 2.3. Catastrophic Behaviour
  • 2.4. Symmetry-breaking and Broken Ergodicity
  • 2.5. Percolation Theory
  • 2.6. The Theory of Self-Organized Criticality
  • 2.7. Path-dependence and Long-time Behaviour: The Role of 'History'
  • 3. Network Externalities and Discontinuous Adoption Paths
  • 3.1. Bandwagon Effects
  • 3.2. The Model
  • 3.3. The Characteristics of the Equilibrium Adoption Path
  • 3.4. Further Remarks
  • 4. Exit from Lock-in and Market Information
  • 4.1. Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms and 'Recontracting' Processes
  • 4.2. The Model
  • 4.3. Pseudo Network Externalities
  • 4.4. Large Deviations
  • 4.5. Examples
  • 4.6. Further Remarks
  • 5. Positive Feedbacks and Lock-in by Random Events
  • 5.1. Competing Technologies and Lock-in
  • 5.2. The Model
  • 5.3. When does Technology B Achieve a Monopoly?
  • 5.4. Lock-in to the 'Wrong' Technology
  • 5.5. Some Policy Issues
  • 6. Regularities in the Aggregate Behaviour of Interacting Economic Agents
  • 6.1. Some Conditions for the Emergence of Institutions
  • 6.2. The Evolution of Conventions
  • 6.3. Evolutionary Game Dynamics
  • 6.4. The Formation of Opinions
  • 6.5. Dynamic Models of Local Interactions
  • 6.6. Morphogenesis of an Institution
  • Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Index
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