Introduction to the philosophy of science : cutting nature at its seams /
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| Author / Creator: | Klee, Robert, 1952- |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | New York : Oxford University Press, 1997. |
| Description: | xi, 258 p. : ill. ; 25 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/3058546 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1. The Case of Allergic Disease: From Everyday Observation to Microstructural Explanation
- 1.1. Experimentation and Research Science
- 1.1.1. Observable Mysteries
- 1.1.2. Physical Microstructure
- 1.2. Mechanism and Testing
- 1.2.1. Mast Cell Release
- 1.2.2. Immunoglobulin E
- 1.3. Intervention and Manipulation
- 1.3.1. Released Inflammatory Mediator Blockade
- 1.3.2. Mast Cell Release Blockade
- 1.3.3. Immunoglobulin E Blockade
- 1.4. Unification and Explanation
- 1.4.1. IgE--anthelminthic
- 1.4.2. Allergy Genes
- 1.4.3. Determination and Explanation
- 2. The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories
- 2.1. Theories as Formal Languages
- 2.2. A Dummy Scientific Theory to Illustrate the Positivist Model
- 3. Trouble in Positivist Paradise
- 3.1. The Point of the Observational/Theoretical Distinction
- 3.1.1. Ease of Application
- 3.1.2. Instrumentation
- 3.1.3. Putnamian Cynicism
- 3.1.4. Encapsulated Information Processing
- 3.1.5. Sensory Surface Distance
- 3.2. Correspondence-Rules
- 3.2.1. Dispositional Properties
- 3.2.2. Holism
- 4. The Underdetermination of Theory
- 4.1. The Quine-Duhem Thesis
- 4.2. Popperian Falsificationism
- 4.3. Is Underdetermination a Myth?
- 4.4. Pragmatism and Realism
- 5. Reductionism, Antireductionism, and Supervenience
- 5.1. Nagel's Model of Reduction
- 5.2. Kemeny & Oppenheim's Model of Reduction
- 5.3. The Unity of Science Program
- 5.4. The Putnam/Fodor Multiple Realization Argument Against the Unity of Science
- 5.5. Supervenience to the Rescue?
- 5.5.1. Kim's Model of Supervenience
- 5.5.2. Modest Physicalism
- 6. The Structure of Scientific Explanation
- 6.1. The Deductive-Nomological (D-N) Model of Scientific Explanation
- 6.1.1 Laws of nature|32. Laws of nature|32 6.1.2
- 6.2. The Aleatory Model of Scientific Explanation
- 6.3. The Unification Model of Scientific Explanation
- 6.4. Natural Kinds, Homeostatic Property Clusters, and the Structural Basis of Reality
- 7. The Revenge of Historicism
- 7.1. Anti-Incrementalism
- 7.2. Paradigms and the Practice of Normal Science
- 7.3. Puzzle-Solving and the Cautiousness of Normal Science
- 7.4. Anomalies
- 7.5. Revolutionary Science
- 7.6. Antirealism, Relativism, and Their Shadows
- 7.7. The Case of Modern Immunology
- 8. The Social Constructivist Challenge
- 8.1. The Strong Programme
- 8.2. Roll Over Socrates: Philosophy as the Bad Guy
- 8.3. The Case Method with a Vengeance
- 8.4. The View from Deep in the Swamp of History
- 8.5. The Inequality of Theoretical Alternatives
- 9. The Politics of Epistemology
- 9.1. The Genderization of Scientific Knowledge
- 9.2. Postmodernist Feminism: Sandra Harding
- 9.3. Feminist Social Activism: Helen Longino
- 9.4. Feminist Empiricism: Lynn Hankinson Nelson
- 10. The Actual Way Things Really Are
- 10.1. What Can or Cannot Happen in the Limit of Inquiry
- 10.2. The Cosmic Coincidence Argument for Scientific Realism
- 10.2.1. The Covergence Argument
- 10.2.2. The Manipulability Argument
- 10.3. The Case for Scientific Antirealism
- 10.3.1. Antirealism: Success is Self-Defeating for Realism
- 10.3.2. Antirealism: Success Needs No Explanation at All
- 10.3.3. Antirealism: Success isn't What You Th
