Korea : the first war we lost /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Alexander, Bevin.
Edition:Hippocrene Books rev. ed.
Imprint:New York : Hippocrene Books, 1998.
Description:xv, 572 p. : maps ; 23 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/3155020
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0781805775 (pbk.)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Review by Choice Review

Alexander's book has too many faults for this reviewer to encourage its purchase. The work does make a contribution, but its benefits are too few and its shortcomings too manifest. On the plus side, Alexander is a military historian who writes vividly about combat, and his political and military judgments are sound. Most positively, he indicates clearly the enormous costs of misreading one's enemy. Alexander describes the ignorance of American leaders regarding the valid concern of the People's Republic of China about the US invasion of North Korea late in 1950. The human and political cost of American vacuity was terrible. Despite these insights, however, the study fails. The first half of the book covers 10 percent of the war; 90 percent treats only one third of the conflict. Alexander has missed most of the combat, and has left out entirely the major contribution airpower made to sustaining the UN's position in Korea. Beyond this imbalance, there are stylistic lapses crying for editorial help. Finally, given the burgeoning economic success of South Korea today when contrasted with the grinding misery of North Korea, one is forced to quibble with Alexander's subtitle, The First War We Lost. Libraries with nominal holdings on the Korean War can avoid this book.-A.L. Gropman, National War College

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Library Journal Review

This respectable and fast-moving study is the first to be written by a professional Army historian. Appropriately, it is as much about politics as combat, and Bevin does a superb job of placing the war in the context of domestic and international affairs. Frequently partisan and often controversial, he capably challenges many of the traditional interpretations of American policy. MacArthur comes across as a military genius and a strategic madman. The combat descriptions are lucid, with good maps; it is easy to follow the military action from grand strategy down to the squad level. The book is historically more complete than Joseph Goulden's Korea ( LJ 2/1/82) and deserves a place in most public collections. Raymond L. Puffer, U.S. Air Force History Prog., Los Angeles (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Review by Kirkus Book Review

The best overview of the Korean conflict since T.R. Fehrenbach's This Kind of War. Like Fehrenbach, Alexander served in Korea (as commander of the Army's 5th Historical Detachment), and his firsthand experience enables him to put the conflict into human-scale focus. He also knows the truth of some enduring battlefield myths, including the misconception that Chinese forces stormed UN positions in human waves; supply constraints forced the Chinese to rely on flanking maneuvers and infiltration. The author also notes that many war-weary warriors did more sleeping than carousing during their R&R leaves in Japan. Alexander is equally good at providing big-picture perspectives. Using recently declassified material, he offers fresh interpretations of the causes and course of the Korean conflict. To illustrate, he convincingly argues that the US, whose forces bore the brunt of the fighting, could have avoided the confrontation with the Communist Chinese had it heeded the clear warning that they required North Korea as a buffer state. Among the key reasons: the obstinancy, even stupidity, of General Douglas MacArthur, whose daring Inchon assault had invested him with an aura of omniscient invincibility. ""In a real sense, the Korean War ended when the peace talks started at Kaesong,"" Alexander reports. But it took two more years to negotiate a cease-fire; during this time, American and Chinese forces engaged one another, sustaining tens of thousands of casualties in the bloody, purposeless process. Strife in the UN's POW compounds took a heavy toll as well, again with virtually no effect upon the outcome of the stalemated conflict. In brief, a balanced, perceptive accounting of what was won and lost in a clash of arms that aroused little interest, let alone passion, on the home front. Campaign maps and scores of photographs complement the scrupulously documented text. Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review


Review by Library Journal Review


Review by Kirkus Book Review