The paradox of self-consciousness /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Bermúdez, José Luis.
Imprint:Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1998.
Description:xiv, 338 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Series:Representation and mind
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/3214923
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0262024411 (alk. paper)
Notes:"A Bradford book."
Includes bibliographical references (p. [313]-325) and index.
Also available on the internet.
Table of Contents:
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • A Note to the Reader
  • 1. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness
  • 1.1. 'I'-Thoughts
  • 1.2. Two Types of First-Person Content
  • 1.3. The First-Person Pronoun and a Deflationary Account of Self-Consciousness
  • 1.4. Explanatory Circularity and Capacity Circularity
  • 1.5. Capacity Circularity: An Innatist Solution?
  • 1.6. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness
  • 2. The Form of a Solution
  • 2.1. The Functionalist Account of Self-Reference
  • 2.2. Rejecting the Classical View of Content
  • 2.3. The Outline of a Solution
  • 3. Content, Concepts, and Language
  • 3.1. Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content: The Richness of Perceptual Experience
  • 3.2. Extending the Notion of Nonconceptual Content: The Autonomy Principle
  • 3.3. Defending the Autonomy Principle: Evidence from Developmental Psychology
  • 3.4. The Autonomy Principle: Further Evidence and Applications
  • 4. The Theory of Nonconceptual Content
  • 4.1. Attributing States with Autonomous Nonconceptual Content
  • 4.2. The Form of Autonomous Nonconceptual Content
  • 5. The Self of Ecological Optics
  • 5.1. Self-Specifying Information in the Field of Vision
  • 5.2. The Content of Ecological Perception
  • 5.3. The Ecological Self in Infancy
  • 5.4. Moving beyond Perception
  • 6. Somatic Proprioception and the Bodily Self
  • 6.1. The Modes of Somatic Proprioception
  • 6.2. Somatic Proprioception and the Simple Argument
  • 6.3. Somatic Proprioception as a Form of Perception
  • 6.4. Somatic Proprioception as a Form of Self-Consciousness
  • 6.5. The Content of Somatic Proprioception
  • 7. Points of View
  • 7.1. Conceptual Points of View and Nonconceptual Points of View
  • 7.2. Self-Specifying Information and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View
  • 7.3. Three Intersecting Distinctions and the Acquisition Constraint
  • 8. Navigation and Spatial Reasoning
  • 8.1. From Place Recognition to a Nonconceptual Point of View: Navigation and Spatial Awareness
  • 8.2. Spatial Awareness and Self-Consciousness
  • 8.3. Cognitive Maps and Integrated Representations of the Environment
  • 8.4. Navigation Deploying and Integrated Representation of the Environment over Time
  • 8.5. The Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View and Primitive Self-Consciousness
  • 9. Psychological Self-Awareness: Self and Others
  • 9.1. The Symmetry Thesis: An Unsuccessful Defence
  • 9.2. The Symmetry Thesis: A Neo-Lockean Defence
  • 9.3. The Core Notion of a Psychological Subject
  • 9.4. The Emergence of Psychological Self-Awareness in Social Interactions
  • 9.5. Conclusion
  • 10. Solving the Paradox of Self-Consciousness
  • 10.1. A Recapitulation
  • 10.2. Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Explanatory Circularity
  • 10.3. Solving the Problem of Capacity Circularity
  • 10.4. The Way Forward
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index