The brink of peace : the Israeli-Syrian negotiations /

Rabinovich, former Israeli ambassador to the US and a prominent specialist in Syrian history and politics, was appointed by then Prime Minister Rabin to head the delegation to peace talks with Syria from 1992 to 1996. He relates, as participant and as diplomatic historian, the inside story and essential features of the failed negotiations around two themes: the ways in which the two countries, with US help, communicated with each other, and the factors leading to failure. Rabinovich argues that Israel and Syria were never on the verge of a breakthrough and faults President Asad for not taking positive steps. Yet, both sides are now familiar with each other's positions, and resumption of negotiations toward a peaceful settlement is possible if the lessons of the failed negotiations are learned. In a wider sense, Rabinovich believes that the study of the negotiations contains important lessons for anyone interested in conflict resolution both on the theoretical level and in the specific Middle Eastern context. This valuable, well-written, objective description and analysis of an important issue will appeal to general readers of international politics as well as to students of Middle Eastern affairs. M. Curtis; Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick

Rabinovich, a history professor at Tel Aviv University, brings a balanced and informative perspective to the subject of peace negotiations between Israel and Syria. His understanding of the historical and cultural nuances of the region go beyond the typical images, if not caricatures, rendered by the Western media. Rabinovich explores the events surrounding the peace negotiations and directs his critical eye at the political conflict within Israel in a manner both provocative and insightful. He notes that Hafiz Asad, former ruler of Syria, was an adamant critic of Anwar Sadat and, in fact, considered him a traitor to the Arab cause for participating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. Yet Asad found himself courting a similar peace accord with Israel while seeking unofficial alliance with the U.S., in effect to restrict Iraq's power in the region. Rabinovich also notes that Sadat secured the return of certain land, a task that has generally gone unduplicated to date. This book is a worthy read for those interested in this conflict beyond the superficial. (Reviewed October 1, 1998)0691058687Vernon Ford

Far less well-known to the American public than the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that led to the accord with the PLO, Israel's four-year diplomatic dialogue with Syria‘conducted mainly in Madrid, Damascus and Washington, D.C., between 1992 and 1996‘was tortuous, complex and ended at an impasse. Rabinovich, the Israeli diplomat and historian who headed Israel's delegation to Syria, has written an evenhanded, densely detailed chronicle that avoids being as plodding as the talks themselves by virtue of its revelations of secret back-channel face-offs and behind-the-scenes glimpses of the Clinton administration's frantic maneuvers. Rabinovich alludes more than once to Israel's and Syria's "mutual demonization," and he concedes that Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was in no hurry to reach an agreement with Syria. Yet he clearly places the brunt of the blame on Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, who saw peace with Israel as an unavoidable prelude to his primary objective‘a better relationship with Washington. Syria's domination of Lebanon (where Damascus offered indirect support to Hizballah terrorists) and Asad's insistence on Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan Heights further strained the negotiations. After Rabin's assassination in 1995, Shimon Peres's willingness to make concessions, according to the author, frightened off Asad, who has not resumed talks. This saga of missed opportunities holds valuable lessons for those seeking peace in the Middle East. Editor, Walter Lippincott. (Sept.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

Diplomatic histories of disputes between two sides usually concern the gradual narrowing of broad differences through negotiation. But in the nearly four years (1992Ž1996) of Israeli-Syrian negotiations chronicled here, readers delve instead into the nature of a protracted stalemate. Despite the bookŽs title, Rabinovich (History/Tel Aviv Univ.), Jerusalem's chief negotiator with Damascus, acknowledges that ``at no point . . . were Israel and Syria on the verge of a breakthrough.'' The primary reason was the lack of what diplomats call ``ripeness,'' i.e., each sideŽs readiness, ideologically and strategically, to come to terms with the primary concerns of the other. This was particularly the case with Syrian president Assad, who was and remains far more hard-line in his approach to Israel than were his Jordanian, Palestinian, and Egyptian counterparts. At one point, he commented to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that his side felt uncomfortable with the term Žnormalization.Ž Thus, he adopted a diplomatic stance that was a Žnon-starterŽ: he made full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights a precondition for any peace with Israel, while remaining maddeningly vague about what he meant by the term Žpeace.Ž Unlike the late Egyptian president Sadat, and also unlike Jordan's King Hussein and even Yassir Arafat, Assad engaged only in sporadic, limited, and often clumsy ``public diplomacy'' in trying to influence the Israeli public. Rabinovich writes clearly and fair-mindedly about the views of both sides; his readers gain a ringside seat at ArabŽIsraeli diplomacy at its most difficult. But he relates a story of such long and intricate diplomatic pettiness, frustrations, and disappointments that it will interest academic mavens of recent Mideast affairs, yet hold only limited appeal for the general reader.