Cost, uncertainty, and welfare : Frank Knight's theory of imperfect competition /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Nash, Stephen John.
Imprint:Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt. : Ashgate, ©1998.
Description:viii, 205 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/3397642
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ISBN:1840145854
9781840145854
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 166-199) and index.
Standard no.:ZBWT00829597
Description
Summary:This work contributes to the discussion of Knight by showing that uncertainty broadens the conception of economic welfare, and that a new cost analysis holds the key to unlocking the Knightian corpus. It develops Knight's suggestion that uncertainty-control costs can be reduced - arguing that the large firm enjoys economic rent from utilizing its dominant vantage point in the market. The author demonstrates that while Knight provides the intellectual stimulus which propelled Chamberlin's thesis of monopolistic competition, Chamberlin uses a very abstract form of uncertainty in his analysis.
Physical Description:viii, 205 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 166-199) and index.
ISBN:1840145854
9781840145854