Price and nonprice rivalry in oligopoly : the integrated battleground /

Price and nonprice rivalry in oligopoly : the integrated battleground /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Kuenne, Robert E.
Imprint:New York, N.Y. : St. Martin's Press, 1998.
Description:xx, 429 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Oligopolies.
Pricing.
Competition.
Competition.
Oligopolies.
Pricing.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/3558026
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0312215738
0333737326 (Macmillan Press LTD)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. 419-422) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Preface
  • Part I. Some Necessary Preliminaries
  • 1. On Definitions and the Problems of Measurement
  • 1. A manifesto
  • 2. Some conceptual challenges
  • 3. Treating the product
  • 4. The measurement and scaling problem
  • 5. The case for quasi-measurement or scaling
  • 6. Summary and conclusions
  • 2. Core Characteristics Analysis
  • 1. Core characteristics analysis
  • 2. Methodologies for quasi-measurement of characteristics: preferences excluded
  • 3. Methodologies for quasi-measurement of characteristics: preferences included
  • 4. The computation of distances in characteristics dimensions and spaces
  • 5. An experiment in characteristics scaling and product distance determination
  • 6. Summary and conclusions
  • 3. Rivalrous Consonance: An Approach to Mature Oligopolistic Competition
  • 1. Mature oligopoly
  • 2. A simple duopoly model
  • 3. Social welfare considerations
  • 4. Summary and conclusions
  • Part II. Decision Making in Oligopoly: Approaches in the Literature
  • 4. Hotelling Models and Other Spatial Analogs
  • 1. Spatial analogs
  • 2. Hotelling models in a linear product space
  • 3. Salop's model with prices variable, locations fixed
  • 4. Models with F.O.B. prices fixed, product locations variable: Eaton and Lipsey's model
  • 5. Models with F.O.B. prices and locations variable
  • 6. Lessons, conjectures, and potential
  • 5. Characteristics as Objects of Consumer Preference
  • 1. The consumption technology
  • 2. A critique of the characteristics approach
  • 3. Conclusions
  • 6. Game-theoretic and Monopolistic Competition Analyses
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Game-theoretic methodology
  • 3. Monopolistic competition methodology
  • 7. Pure Competition and Monopoly: A Beginning
  • 1. Separable pricing of characteristics
  • 2. Nonseparable pricing of characteristics
  • 3. The welfare implications of simple oligopoly under rivalrous consonance: a comparison
  • 4. A summary
  • Part III. Theoretical Guidance to and Usage of Modeling Methodologies
  • 8. The Isolated Firm and Consumer Benchmarking of Measurable Characteristics
  • 1. Unwarrantied products with nonaging characteristics
  • 2. Warrantied products with nonaging characteristics
  • 3. Unwarrantied products with aging characteristics
  • 4. Warrantied products with aging characteristics
  • 5. Some conclusions and conjectures
  • 9. Oligopolistic Competition and Consumer Benchmarking in a Rivalrous Consonance Market Structure: Measurable Characteristics
  • 1. Purpose and structure of the model
  • 2. The model
  • 3. First-order conditions
  • 4. Algorithm to solve the model
  • 5. Generalization to n firms
  • 6. Conclusions
  • 10. Oligopolistic Competition with Scaling of Characteristics
  • 1. Scaling by quality indifference premia
  • 2. Model 1: Spatial distances as metric with no tacit collusion
  • 3. Model 2: Spatial distances as metric with the rivalrous consonance mode of tacit collusion
  • 4. A summary and conclusions
  • 11. Nodal Changes in Brand Locations in Product Space
  • 1. Nodal relocation on a product space without tacit collusion
  • 2. Nodal relocation on a product space with tacit collusion
  • 3. Nodal relocation with cost structure equalization
  • 4. Tacit collusion and entry of new firms
  • 5. Summary and conclusions
  • 12. Selling Costs and Cognitive Distancing
  • 1. Model 1--Informational advertising with no tacit collusion, revenue-determined advertising
  • 2. Model 2--Informational advertising with no tacit collusion, profit-optimal advertising
  • 3. Model 3--Informational and cognitive positioning advertising with no tacit collusion
  • 4. Model 4--Informational and cognitive positioning advertising under rivalrous consonance
  • 5. Summary and conclusions
  • Part IV. Epilog and Prospectus
  • 03. A Final Word
  • 1. In the way of a recapitulation
  • 2. Results and conjectures
  • 3. Deficiencies in models and modeling methodology
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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