Modeling rationality, morality, and evolution /
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| Imprint: | New York : Oxford University Press, 1998. |
|---|---|
| Description: | 463 p. : ill. ; 23 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Vancouver studies in cognitive science v. 7 |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/3670026 |
Table of Contents:
- Ackowledgements
- Contributors
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Rationality and Rules
- 3. Intention and Deliberation
- 4. Following Through with One's Plans: Reply to David Gauthier
- 5. How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem
- 6. Economics of the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Background
- 7. Modeling Rationality: Normative or Descriptive?
- 8. Theorem 1
- 9. The Failure of Success: Intrafamilial Exploitation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
- 10. Transforming Social Dilemmas: Group Identity and Co-Operation
- 11. Beliefs and Co-Operation
- 12. The Nueral Representation of the Social World
- 13. Moral Dualism
- 14. Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality
- 15. Why We Need a Moral Equilibrium Theory
- 16. Morality's Last Chance
- 17. Mutual Aid: Darwin Meets The Logic of Decision
- 18. Three Differences between Deliberation and Evolution
- 19. Evolutionary Models of Co-Operation Mechanisms: Artificial Morality and Genetic Programming
- 20. Norms as Emergent Properties of Adaptive Learning: The Case of Economic Routines