Getting even : revenge as a form of justice /

Barton examines whether revenge and retribution are morally indefensible and develops a circumspect but sustained argument supporting moral retributivism. He argues that revenge is a species of personal retribution that can be just or unjust depending on whether principles of justice that avoid punishing the innocent and proportionality are duly observed. Barton contends that courts ought to recognize revenge motives of victims as legitimate, rational, and within the rules of justice. The moral permissibility of institutionalized revenge, he argues, can be justified by reference to the retributive liability borne by wrongdoers for their action and the importance of victim justice and restoration requiring the involvement of victims in the criminal justice process. The promotion of a feeling of satisfaction with justice is best achieved through victim empowerment while maximizing (or minimizing) satisfaction (or frustration) when dealing with causes and consequences of criminal wrongdoing. Barton cautions that, while states should ensure formal and informal processes of dispute resolution in criminal justice disputes, its agents ought not take over dispute processing roles from those immediately affected. To those who outrightly reject the concept of revenge, both the thesis and conclusions would remain unconvincing, but Barton's lucidity and thoughtfulness in tackling this controversial issue should be applauded. Faculty and graduate students interested in political philosophy and theory. M. G. Pufong; Valdosta State University