Can no antitrust policy be better than some antitrust policy? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Mattoo, Aaditya.
Imprint:	Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade, [1999]
Description:	39 p. ; 28 cm.
Language:	English
Series:	Policy research working paper ; 2191 Policy research working papers ; 2191.
Subject:	Antitrust law. Trade regulation. Competition. Protectionism. Consolidation and merger of corporations. Oligopolies. Antitrust law. Competition. Consolidation and merger of corporations. Oligopolies. Protectionism. Trade regulation.
Format:	E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4060243

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	World Bank. Development Research Group. Trade.
Notes:	"September 1999"--Cover. Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-36). Also available on the World Wide Web.
Summary:	Partial antitrust policy may lead to less competitive market structures than the total absence of such policy. There may sometimes even be a case for the government providing incentives for particular forms of merger.

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Can no antitrust policy be better than some antitrust policy? /

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