When bad things happen to other people /

These two books are both concerned with people's responses to the situations of other people, especially insofar as these situations relate to the interests or welfare of those others, but the books are very different. Portmann (philosophy PhD from the Univ. of Virginia) is primarily concerned with distinguishing Schadenfreude from other concepts with which it might be confused, arguing that it need not always imply malice, and that Schadenfreude is often an appropriate response to many human situations--e.g., when someone slips on a banana peel but is not badly hurt, or when wrongdoers receive their just desert. In fact, Portmann argues, the pleasure taken in the sufferings of others, when those sufferings are due to their own moral violations, can be an expression of one's own commitment to the morality that is violated. In any case, Schadenfreude is universal. To pretend otherwise is generally the result of confusion or hypocrisy. Ozinga (political science, Oakland Univ.), on the other hand, argues that altruism--which he defines as "behavior benefiting someone else at some cost to oneself"--is much more natural and widespread than is often acknowledged. It is part of nature--found in the animal world. And it is part of human nature too, but many people tend to regard all human behavior as selfish--"behavior that benefits oneself at some cost to others." Ozinga is clear that selfishness is a vice, and that its viciousness stems from the placement of costs on others (not with bringing benefit to oneself). Both books argue interesting theses. Portmann argues that Schadenfreude is not always to be condemned. Ozinga argues that altruism is not so dreamy and idealistic that we never find it in the real world. Portmann and Ozinga agree that the object of their study is more common that has hitherto been admitted. Both books are recommended for all readership levels. S. Satris Clemson University

Does taking pleasure in the pain of another always represent malice? Or can this emotion reflect a thoughtful respect for justice? And what about humor, which often revolves around a "comeuppance" that those who laugh see as trivial (though the laughter's target may disagree)? These are the sorts of questions Portmann takes on in his nuanced analysis of schadenfreude. The subject has been debated by philosophers over the generations; Portmann engages with them, from Kant and Freud to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. He draws on literature, too, exploring the positions of Kafka and Dickens, Umberto Eco and Toni Morrison, and applies his normative notion of schadenfreude to current debates on subjects such as capital punishment, media violence, and the cult of celebrity. Portmann defends schadenfreude but urges attention to its basis in "power structures and social forces through which our characters both take shape and shape the lives of those around us." A demanding but productively provocative analysis. --Mary Carroll