Strategic human resources : frameworks for general managers /

Strategic human resources : frameworks for general managers /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Baron, James N.
Imprint:New York : John Wiley, c1999.
Description:xxi, 602 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Personnel management.
Personnel management.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4306691
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Kreps, David M.
ISBN:0471072532 (cloth : alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Chapter 1. Introduction
  • The Premises of this Book
  • Payback Time
  • Three Axes We Will Grind
  • The Structure of the Book
  • What this Book Lacks
  • Chapter 2. The Five Factors
  • The External Environment: Social, Political, Legal, and Economic
  • The Workforce
  • The Organization's Culture
  • The Organization's Strategy
  • The Technology of Production and Organization of Work
  • Applying the Five Factors: the Case of IBM
  • One Size Does Not Fit All
  • Three Caveats About the "Five Factors"
  • Chapter 3. Consistent HR Practices: The Whole Can Be More than the Sum of the Parts
  • Why Is Consistency of HR Practices Desirable?
  • Measuring Consistency
  • The Organizational Menagerie
  • Consistency and Inconsistency: Two Illustrative Cases
  • The Span of Consistency
  • Temporal Consistency and Organizational Inertia
  • Inconsistent Consistencies
  • Summary and Road Map
  • Chapter 4. Employment and Economics
  • The Basic Framework
  • Achieving Efficient Employment Relations
  • Balance of Power and Reputation
  • Qualifications and Amendments
  • Determining the Terms of Trade
  • Long-Term Employment Relationships
  • Sun Hydraulics: Trust and Love
  • Takeaways
  • Beyond Economics
  • Chapter 5. Employment as a Social Relation
  • Anchoring and Expectations
  • The Psychology of Attribution and Motivation
  • Social Comparison
  • Categorization Processes In Organizations
  • Distributive and Procedural Justice
  • Reciprocity and Gift Exchange
  • Status (In)Consistency
  • Legitimacy and Organizational Inertia
  • Summary and Prospectus
  • Chapter 6. Voice: Unions and Other Forms of Employee Representation
  • Employee Voice as a Matter of Law
  • Why Should You Care About Unions?
  • What Is the Impact of Worker Representation?
  • The Two Faces of Unions
  • Why Unions May Enhance Efficiency: Transaction Cost Rationales
  • Why Unions May Enhance Efficiency: Psychological and Social Rationales
  • Voice Without Authority
  • Further Remarks on Unions
  • The Bottom Line for Management
  • Nonunion Worker Representation?
  • What Next?
  • Chapter 7. Employment, Society, and the Law
  • The Normative Bases for Intervention
  • Positive Reasons Why Society Intervenes
  • Some Lessons for the General Manager
  • Chapter 8. Internal Labor Markets
  • Forces Leading to the Emergence of Internal Labor Markets
  • Critiques of ILMs
  • The Diffusion of ILMs
  • Effects and Implications of Internal Labor Markets
  • ILMs and the Five Factors
  • Chapter 9. High-Commitment HRM
  • Goals and Means
  • Three Flavors of High-Commitment HRM
  • One Size Does Not Fit All: Is High-Commitment HRM for You?
  • Moving On
  • Chapter 10. Performance Evaluation
  • The Diverse Functions of Performance Evaluation
  • Characteristics of Different Performance Evaluation Systems
  • Four Constituencies of the Evaluation System
  • Performance Evaluation Systems and the Five Factors
  • Striking Balance in Performance Evaluation Systems: Some Key Issues and Tactics
  • Should Individuals Be Evaluated at All? Should Summary Evaluations Be Included?
  • Summary
  • Chapter 11. Pay for Performance
  • The Economic Theory of Incentives
  • Noneconomic Caveats
  • Bonuses or Raises?
  • Group Incentive Schemes
  • The Case Against Pay for Performance
  • Why It Worked at Safelite: The Five Factors and Piece-Rate Pay
  • Pay for Performance?
  • Chapter 12. Compensation Systems: Forms, Bases, and Distribution of Rewards
  • The Basis for Pay: Tasks, Status, Skills, Seniority
  • Dispersion, Compression, and Information
  • The Form of Compensation (Including Benefits)
  • Compensation--The Bottom Line
  • Chapter 13. Job Design
  • The Level and Breadth of Job Content
  • Over-Time Variability in Task Assignment and Extent of Rotations
  • The Mix of Tasks
  • Team (versus Individual) Job Designs
  • Autonomy
  • Job Design and the External Environment
  • Symbols and Job Design: Job Titles and Other Atmospherics
  • Job Design or Career Design?
  • Wrap-Up
  • Chapter 14. Staffing and Recruitment
  • What Sort of Workforce Does the Firm Want?
  • Encouraging the Right Applicants
  • Selecting Among the Applicants
  • Validating Staffing and Recruitment Methods and Other Legal Concerns
  • Some Additional Process Considerations
  • What Next?
  • Chapter 15. Training
  • Why Do Firms Train Workers?
  • The Gross Benefits from Training
  • The Ability to Appropriate the Returns to Training
  • The Costs of Training
  • Making and Evaluating Training Decisions
  • Designing Training Programs
  • Lessons for the British Chemical Firm
  • Takeaways
  • Chapter 16. Promotion and Career Concerns
  • Serving Too Many Masters?
  • Unhappy Consequences of the Promotion Pyramid
  • Why Is Rank Tied to Compensation, Status, and Other Rewards?
  • Is There a Solution?
  • What Next?
  • Chapter 17. Downsizing
  • Why Do Firms Downsize?
  • The Effects of Downsizing
  • The Moral from the Data
  • Must You Downsize?
  • How to Downsize if You Must: Process Considerations
  • Conclusion and Coming Attractions
  • Chapter 18. Outsourcing
  • The Rise of Outscoring and Contingent Labor: More Data
  • The Bottom Line
  • Outscoring to Avoid Legal Liabilities
  • Two Mixed Cases
  • The Case of Information Technology
  • Outsourcing and Downsizing
  • Summary and Coming Attractions
  • Chapter 19. HRM in Emerging Companies
  • A Source of Data on HRM in New Enterprises: The Stanford Project on Emerging Companies
  • Founders' Blueprints for HRM
  • The Founder's Choice of Model
  • Changes in the HR Blueprint: Interviews with CEOs
  • Consequences of Founders' HR Blueprints
  • Change, Turnover, and Organizational Upheaval
  • Conclusion and (the Final) Coming Attraction
  • Chapter 20. Organizing HR
  • What Are the HR Tasks to Be Done?
  • Diagnosis: The "Lowest Common Denominator" Syndrome
  • A Possible Cure, Part I: Delegating the Mundane
  • Our Cure, Part II: Top and Line Management versus "Serious" HR Professionals
  • Staffing, Training, and Career Paths for the HR Function
  • Corporate versus Unit and Subunit HR
  • Four Process Issues
  • Concluding Remarks
  • Appendix A. Transaction Cost Economics
  • Basic Ideas
  • Between Unified Governance and Classical Transactions: Relational Contracting
  • Employment Relations and Transaction Cost Economics
  • Appendix B. Reciprocity and Reputation in Repeated Interactions
  • Theory
  • Applications
  • The Limitations of Game Theory
  • Appendix C. Agency Theory
  • A Simple Version
  • Beyond Effort Aversion, a Single Period, and One Signal of Effort
  • Appendix D. Adverse Selection and Market Signaling
  • The Problem of Lemons
  • Market Signals
  • Out-of-Equilibrium Signals and the Problem of Inference
  • Inefficiency
  • Pooling
  • Screening
  • Index

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