Environmental taxation and the double dividend /
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| Author / Creator: | Mooij, Ruud A. de |
|---|---|
| Edition: | 1st ed. |
| Imprint: | Amsterdam ; New York : Elsevier Science BV, 2000. |
| Description: | xviii, 292 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Contributions to economic analysis. 246 |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4325421 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. A survey of the double-dividend literature
- 2.1. Early literature
- 2.1.1. Environmental tax reform
- 2.1.2. Tax reform versus optimal tax
- 2.1.3. Optimal second-best pollution taxes
- 2.2. Recent literature
- 2.2.1. Environmental tax reform
- 2.2.2. Optimal environmental tax
- 2.3. Tax-shifting
- 2.3.1. Tax shifting between factors
- 2.3.2. Tax shifting across countries
- 2.3.3. Tax shifting between incomes
- 2.4. Political-economy issues
- 2.5. Interactions between dividends
- 2.6. Conclusions
- 3. Environmental tax reform in the benchmark model
- 3.1. The benchmark model
- 3.1.1. Structure of the model
- Firms
- Households
- Government
- Environmental quality
- International trade
- 3.1.2. Linearization
- 3.1.3. Welfare
- Dividing the MEB into distortions
- Dividing the MEB into dividends
- 3.2. Environmental taxes on households
- 3.2.1. Starting without initial environmental taxes
- 3.2.2. Starting from positive environmental taxes
- 3.2.3. Starting from a Pigovian tax
- 3.3. Environmental taxes on firms
- 3.3.1. Starting without initial environmental taxes
- 3.3.2. Starting from positive environmental taxes
- 3.3.3. Starting from a Pigovian tax
- 3.4. Optimal environmental taxes
- Discussion
- 3.5. Numerical simulations
- 3.5.1. Calibration
- 3.5.2. Simulation results
- 3.6. Conclusions
- Appendix 3A. Behavioral relations
- Factor demand relations
- Consumption and labor supply
- Appendix 3B. Marginal excess burden
- Appendix 3C. Analytical solution of the model
- 4. The role of capital mobility and factor substitution
- 4.1. The model with mobile capital in production
- 4.1.1. Structure of the model
- 4.1.2. Linearization
- 4.1.3. Welfare
- 4.2. Optimal taxation
- 4.2.1. Unconstrained optimization
- 4.2.2. Optimal tax with fixed capital or pollution tax
- 4.2.3. Optimal tax with fixed labor tax
- 4.3. Tax reform from labor to pollution taxes
- 4.3.1. Starting from zero non-labor taxes
- 4.3.2. Starting from a positive pollution tax
- 4.3.3. Starting from a positive capital tax
- 4.3.4. Starting from an arbitrary equilibrium
- 4.4. Tax reform from capital to pollution taxes
- 4.4.1. Starting from zero non-labor taxes
- 4.4.2. Starting from a positive pollution tax
- 4.4.3. Starting from a positive capital tax
- 4.4.4. Starting from an arbitrary equilibrium
- 4.5. The model with fixed capital in production
- 4.5.1. Structure of the model
- 4.5.2. Linearization
- 4.5.3. Welfare
- 4.6. Optimal taxation
- 4.6.1. Unconstrained optimization
- 4.6.2. Optimal tax with a fixed profit tax
- Profits cannot bear the burden of taxation
- Labor supplied infinitely elastically
- General case
- 4.6.3. Optimal tax system with fixed pollution tax
- 4.6.4. Optimal tax system with fixed labor tax
- 4.7. Tax reform from labor to pollution taxes
- 4.7.1. Starting from a 100% profit tax
- 4.7.2. Starting from a less than 100% profit tax
- 4.8. Numerical simulations
- 4.8.1. Calibration
- 4.8.2. Model simulations with mobile capital
- 4.8.3. Model simulations with fixed capital
- 4.9. Conclusions
- Appendix 4A. Optimal taxes in the model with mobile capital
- Appendix 4B. Tax reform in the model with mobile capital
- Endogenous labor tax
- Endogenous capital income tax
- Appendix 4C. Optimal taxes in the model with fixed capital
- Appendix 4D. Tax reform in the model with fixed capital
- 5. Environmental taxes as trade-policy instruments
- 5.1. The three-country model
- 5.1.1. Structure of the model
- Country 1. The home country
- Country 2. The supplier of polluting inputs
- Country 3. The rest of the world
- International markets
- The global environment
- 5.1.2. Linearization
- The price of polluting inputs
- The price of intermediate inputs
- Differences with the benchmark model
- 5.1.3. Welfare
- Welfare in the home country
- Welfare in other countries
- Global welfare
- 5.2. Tax shifting to foreign suppliers of polluting inputs
- 5.2.1. Optimal environmental tax
- 5.2.2. Environmental tax reform
- 5.2.3. Optimal tax from a global perspective
- 5.3. Tax shifting to foreign users of intermediate inputs
- 5.3.1. Optimal environmental tax
- 5.3.2. Environmental tax reform
- 5.3.3. Optimal tax from a global perspective
- Discussion
- 5.4. Numerical simulations
- 5.4.1. Endogenous energy price
- An OECD-wide energy tax reform
- An EU-wide energy tax reform
- 5.4.2. Endogenous price of intermediate inputs
- 5.5. Conclusions
- 6. Environmental taxes and distributional concerns
- 6.1. The model with heterogeneous households
- 6.1.1. Structure of the model
- The modified household model
- Aggregation
- 6.1.2. Linearization
- 6.1.3. Welfare
- Distribution of welfare
- A utilitarian measure for social welfare
- Two options for revenue recycling
- 6.2. Environmental tax reform
- 6.2.1. Exogenous non-labor incomes
- Higher non-labor incomes
- Environmental tax reform
- The utilitarian strong double dividend
- Distributional consequences
- 6.2.2. Indexation of non-labor incomes
- Discussion on the weak double dividend
- Revenue-raising vs. non-revenue-raising
- 6.3. Numerical simulations
- 6.3.1. Fixed nominal non-labor incomes
- 6.3.2. Indexed real non-labor incomes
- 6.4. Conclusions
- 7. Labor-market imperfections and the triple dividend
- 7.1. The model with an imperfect labor market
- 7.1.1. Structure of the model
- The wage-bargaining process
- The reservation wage
- 7.1.2. Linearization
- Factor demand
- Value-added per worker
- Wage rate
- 7.1.3. Welfare
- 7.2. Environmental tax reform
- 7.2.1. Fixed consumer wages
- Pink welfare
- Green welfare
- Blue welfare
- Overall welfare
- 7.2.2. Effects of labor taxes and labor productivity
- Indexation to after-tax wages
- Alternative indexation rules
- Discussion
- 7.2.3. Perfectly competitive labor market
- 7.2.4. Wage curve
- 7.3. Numerical simulations
- 7.3.1. Fixed consumer wages
- 7.3.2. Indexation to after-tax wages
- 7.3.3. Real wage resistance
- 7.3.4. No indexation
- 7.3.5. Wage curve
- 7.3.6. Competitive labor market
- 7.3.7. Results from other studies
- 7.4. Conclusions
- 8. Feedback effects of the environment on the economy
- 8.1. Production externalities
- 8.1.1. The model
- 8.1.2. Environmental tax reform
- 8.1.3. Optimal environmental tax
- 8.2. Non-separable consumption externalities
- 8.2.1. The model
- 8.2.2. Environmental tax reform
- 8.2.3. Optimal environmental tax
- 8.3. Numerical simulations
- 8.3.1. Separable production externalities
- 8.3.2. Non-separable consumption externalities
- 8.4. Conclusions
- 9. Green tax reform in an endogenous growth model
- 9.1. The model
- 9.1.1. Structure of the model
- Production function
- Firm behavior
- Household behavior
- Government
- Environmental quality
- Walras law
- 9.1.2. Linearization
- 9.1.3. Welfare
- 9.2. Effects on growth, pollution and welfare
- 9.2.1. Effects on growth and environment
- 9.2.2. Welfare effects
- 9.2.3. Optimal pollution taxes
- 9.3. Tax shifting
- 9.3.1. Effects on growth and pollution
- 9.3.2. Welfare effects
- 9.4. Pollution permits
- 9.5. Conclusions
- Appendix 9A. Linearizing the factor-demand equations
- Specification of F
- Specification of M
- Specification of N and Y
- Linearizing marginal factor productivity
- Linearizing factor-demand equations
- Appendix 9B. Welfare effects
- Appendix 9C. Solution of the model
- Appendix 9D. Pollution permits
- 10. Conclusions
- References