Review by Choice Review
This book consists of Thomson's revised 1999 Tanner Lectures on Human Values, with commentaries by Philip Fisher, Martha Nussbaum, Jerome Schneewind, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, and a reply to each from Thomson (MIT). In part 1 ("Goodness"), Thomson takes on the fact-value problem, arguing that (1) no such problem exists if one accepts that things are never simply "good" or "bad," but are always good or bad in some way, and (2) since consequentialism cannot accept this, it is to be rejected. By attending to the ways in which a thing can be good, Thomson also believes we can explain the concept of a "reason for action." Part 2 ("Advice") sketches the structure of the theory Thomson believes should replace consequentialism, which answers the question of what we ought do. Not surprisingly, it leans heavily on the notion of rights and our obligation to avoid injustice. Of her commentators, Nussbaum suggests that more recent (i.e., non-Moorean) models of consequentialism may avoid Thomson's critique; Schneewind wonders if Thomson's nuanced account of "ought" isn't more culture-bound than she admits. As always, Thomson's writing is clear, crisp, and direct. Graduate students; faculty and researchers. M. R. Hebert Austin College
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
