When governments collide : coercion and diplomacy in the Vietnam conflict, 1964-1968 /

In 1974, the Johnson Administration decided to escalate US military action in Vietnam in order to coerce the North Vietnamese into negotiations. The policy never worked. What is the likelihood, asks political scientist Thies (Univ. of California, Berkeley), that any policy of coercion between governments employing acts as well as words will succeed? Using a detailed history of Vietnam escalation and response as a test case, he answers that it is very unlikely, indeed. The root problem is that governments are not individuals, and the proponents of escalating coercion fail to understand the difference. First off, there is the presumption that such a policy can be made ""operative"" and ""orchestrated,"" so that specific military actions will be taken in conjunction with other designated military or diplomatic actions. But bureaucracies don't work that way, and the result is conflicting ""signals."" A plan to bomb progressively closer to Hanoi--to signal that time remains to make a conciliatory ""gesture"" before Hanoi itself is hit--falls apart when area commanders start bombing helter-skelter. No signal, just noise. Then there's the problem that the other side may not interpret the signals the way they're supposed to (e.g., the North Vietnamese responded to Johnson's first public threat by sending more troops into the South). Thies also uses material from the North Vietnamese to argue that once a policy is set, such as the North's decision to actively intervene in the South, the bureaucratic infighting that preceded the decision mitigates against it being abandoned: too many careers are involved. In short, bureaucratic politics at both ends keep the signals crossed. Thies' study is valuable for its detailed history of the policy of escalation--and its little-known ramifications in North Vietnam--as well as for its warning that the military power of large bureaucratic states offers false images of coercive strength. Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.