Reference and essence /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Salmon, Nathan U., 1951-
Imprint:	Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1981.
Description:	xvi, 293 p. ; 24 cm.
Language:	English
Subject:	Putnam, Hilary Putnam, Hilary. Reference (Philosophy) Essentialism (Philosophy) Object (Philosophy) Essentialism (Philosophy) Object (Philosophy) Reference (Philosophy)
Format:	Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/464339

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	0691072647 : $22.50 0691101280 (lim. pbk. ed.) : $9.95
Notes:	Based on the author's thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California at Los Angeles, 1979. Includes indexes. Bibliography: p. 265-278.

Table of Contents:

Preface to the First Edition
Preface to the Expanded Edition
Introduction
I. The Theory of Direct Reference
1. The Theory of Singular Direct Reference
1. A Formulation of the Theory
1.1. The Orthodox Notion of Sense
1.2. Descriptional Singular Terms
1.3. Relationally Descriptional Singular Terms
1.4. Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference
2. The Arguments
2.1. The Modal Arguments
2.2. The Epistemological Arguments
2.3. The Semantical Arguments
2.4. Contextual Factors in Reference
3. Rigid Designators
3.1. Two Kinds of Rigid Designators: Persistence and Obstinacy
3.2. Proper Names, Nondescriptionality, and Obstinacy
3.3. A Criterion for Obstinacy
2. The Theory Extended to General Terms
4. A Reformulation of the Theory
4.1. Descriptional General Terms
4.2. Common Nouns as Proper Names
4.3. A Point of Disanalogy
4.4. Designation
4.5. Relationally Descriptional Designators
4.6. Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference
4.7. The Traditional Theory of Cognition and Understanding
5. The Arguments Reconsidered
5.1. The General Form of the Arguments
5.2. An Obvious Objection
5.3. A Reply: Putnam's Twin Earth Argument
6. Rigid Designators Reconsidered
6.1. General Term Designation and Rigid Designation
6.2. A Criterion for General Term Designation
3. Reference and the Necessary A Posteriori
7. Some Consequences of the Theory
7.1. Traditional Assimilations
7.2. Necessary A Posteriori Identities
7.3. The General Phenomenon
8. Other Alleged Necessary A Posteriori Truths
8.1. The Examples
8.2. Trivial Essentialism
8.3. Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Natural Kinds
8.4. Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Individuals
9. A Crucial Question
4. Putnam's Theory of Natural Kind Terms
10. Putnam's Theses
11. Initial Exegetical Remarks
11.1. The 'is' of Instantiation
11.2. A Gross Misinterpretation
11.3. A Subtle Misinterpretation
11.4. A Difficulty in Interpretation
12. First Formulations
12.1. An Initial Formalization
12.2. Time-Slices and Possible World-Slices of Continuant Individuals
12.3. An Initial Attempt to Eliminate Possible World-Slices
13. Cross-World Relations
13.1. Cross-World Construal of Binary Relations
13.2. Intra-World Attributes, Extra-World Attributes, and Cross-World Relations
13.3. A Mechanism for Generating Cross-World Relations
13.4. Nondenoting Singular Terms
14. Reformulations
14.1. A New Attempt at Formalization
14.2. Thesis (T3)
14.3. Reductionism and Analysis
14.4. Translation into Modal Operator Discourse
15. Further Exegetical Remarks
15.1. Theses (T5) and (T6)
15.2. Thesis (T4)
15.3. Thesis (T7)
15.4. Thesis (T6) Again
II. The Program to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference
5. The K and I Mechanisms
16. Putnam on (T9)
17. Donnellan's Elucidations of (T9)
18. The OK-Mechanism
18.1. A Valid Modal Argument
18.2. The General Case
19. The General K-Mechanism and the I-Mechanism
19.1. The General K-Mechanism
19.2. The I-Mechanism
20. The Program
6. Hidden Essentialism in the K and I Mechanisms
21. The First Two Premises
22. The Third Premise
22.1. Putnam and Donnellan on the Third Premise
22.2. Formalization
22.3. The K-Mechanisms
22.4. The I-Mechanism
23. The Failure of the Program
23.1. The Original Argument
23.2. The K and I Mechanisms
7. Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin
24. Kripke and the Putnam Program
25. Kripke's "Proof" of the Essentiality of Origin
25.1. Kripke's Formulation of Argument
25.2. Some Initial Considerations
25.3. The Compossibility Premise
25.4. The Unfinished Argument
25.5. A Principle of Cross-World Identification
25.6. An Alternative Argument
26. Compossibility Principles and Cross-World Identification Principles
Conclusion
Appendix I. Principles of Cross-World Identification
27. Cross-World Identification Principles and the Ship of Theseus
27.1. An Argument for Contingent Identity
27.2. A Fallacy
27.3. A Better Theory
28. The Four Worlds Paradox
28.1. The Argument
28.2. One Solution
28.3. A Better Solution
28.4. Vagueness and the Paradox
Appendix II. The Essentialist Principles in the K and I Mechanisms
29. Donnellan vs. Kripke
30. A Problem in the Epistemology of Modality
31. The Nonmodal Consequences
32. Connecting Statements
32.1. The Need for Connecting Statements
32.2. The Theoretical Status of the Connecting Statements
33. Conclusion
Appendix III. Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox
34. Fregean Theory
35. The Four Worlds Paradox
Appendix IV. Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints
36. Modal Paradox
37. A Modal Fallacy
38. Counterpart Theory
39. Modal Paradox and Sorites
40. Some Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory
41. More Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory
42. The Solution Refined
43. Vagueness and Modal Paradox
44. Twin Worlds
45. Necessity and Apriority
46. The Determinacy of Identity
Appendix V. Cross-World Identification and Stipulation
47. Haecceitism, Reductionism, and the Problem of Cross-World Identification
48. A Residual Problem of Cross-World Identification
49. A Third Problem of Cross-World Identification
Appendix VI. Letter to Teresa Robertson
50. If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It
51. If It Is, Do
Appendix VII. Naming, Necessity, and Beyond
52. Substitution
53. Are General Terms Rigid?
54. The Necessity of Water Being H[subscript 2]O
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Reference and essence /

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