Social choice mechanisms /
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| Author / Creator: | Danilov, Vladimir Ivanovich. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Berlin ; New York : Springer, c2002. |
| Description: | vi, 191 p. : ill. ; 25 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Studies in economic design |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4684811 |
Table of Contents:
- 1. Basic Concepts
- Social Choice Correspondences
- Monotone Social Choice Correspondences
- Social Choice Mechanisms
- Effectivity Functions and Blockings
- 2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms
- Definitions and Examples
- Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms
- Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences
- Nash-implementable Correspondences
- Implementation: the Case of Two Participants
- Acceptable Mechanisms
- 3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms
- Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle
- Single-Peaked Environment
- Linear Environment
- The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms
- Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms
- 4. Cores and Stable Blockings
- Stable Outcomes
- Additive Blockings
- Convex Blockings
- Almost Additive Blockings
- Necessary Stability Conditions
- Veto as a Decision-making Procedure
- 5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms
- Definitions and Examples
- A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism)
- Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms
- Direct Core Mechanisms
- Laminable Blockings
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability
- Neutral Laminable Blockings.
