When the stakes are high : deterrence and conflict among major powers /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Danilovic, Vesna, 1961-
Imprint:Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c2002.
Description:xv, 294 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4787060
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ISBN:0472112872 (cloth : alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. 259-279) and index.
Review by Choice Review

Danilovic (Texas A&M Univ.) explores the often neglected issue of inherent credibility within the general theory of military deterrence. He argues that major powers are more likely to clash over their interest in a third nation (allies, major economic partners, clients, etc.) than they are to directly threaten each other's territory. His central argument is that vital national interests are the bedrock of inherent credibility. The theoretical analysis discusses the relative importance of the key factors (relative power, regional stakes, domestically influenced stakes, and costly signaling strategies) that constitute the predictors of the likely outcome of such major power conflicts over a third nation. In his empirical test the findings show that inherent credibility, defined as vital interests in the region of dispute, is strongly correlated to the success or failure of deterrence in times of crises. Success or failure is related to "the inherent credibility of each side's threats, reflecting the stakes that the confronting major powers have in the region of the third nation's location." The case studies of extended deterrence range from historical crises such as the 1895-96 South African Crisis, the 1888-99 Anglo-Russian Crisis, to more recent ones like the 1961 Berlin Wall and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. E. Conteh-Morgan University of South Florida

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review