Terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and weapons of mass destruction defending the U.S. homeland /
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| Author / Creator: | Cordesman, Anthony H. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Westport, CT : Praeger, 2002. |
| Description: | x, 448 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4844863 |
Table of Contents:
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1. The Changing Face of Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism
- The Growing Focus on Terrorism
- Terrorism versus Asymmetric Warfare
- Chapter 2. Risk Assessment: Planning for "Non-patterns" and Potential Risk
- Looking Beyond Emotional Definitions of Terrorism
- Rethinking the Mid- and Long-term Risk of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Attack
- Patterns and Non-patterns in the Number of Attacks
- Casualties versus Incidents: The Lack of Correlation
- U.S. and American Casualties versus International Casualties
- Considering the Threat from State and Non-state Actors
- States, "Terrorists," and Acts of War
- Planning for Major Attacks and Asymmetric Warfare by State Actors
- The Threat of "Proxies" and "Networks"
- Dealing with Nuance and Complex Motives
- Consideration of the Full Spectrum of Possible Types and Methods of Attack: The Need to Consider "Worst Cases"
- Making Offense, Deterrence, Denial, Defense, and Retaliation Part of Homeland Defense
- Linking Homeland Defense to Counterproliferation
- Chapter 3. Threat Prioritization: Seeking to Identify Current and Future Threats
- Potential State Actors
- A Department of State Assessment of State Threats
- A Department of Defense Assessment of Threats from Foreign States
- The Probable Lack of Well-Defined Strategic Warning of a Threat from State Actors and Unpredictable Behavior in a Crisis
- Foreign Terrorists and Extremists
- Continuing Threats and Counterterrorist Action
- Major Foreign Terrorist Groups and Extremists
- Threats from Foreign Students and Immigrants
- Domestic Terrorists and Extremists
- The Implications of Past Terrorist Attacks
- Probability versus Probability Theory
- Chapter 4. Types of Attack: Determining Future Methods of Attack and the Needed Response
- Illustrative Attack Scenarios
- "Conventional" Means of Attack
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Chemical Weapons As Means of Attack
- The Impact and Variety of Possible Chemical Weapons
- The probable Lethality and Effectiveness of Chemical Attacks
- Methods of Delivery
- Detection and Interception
- Acquiring Chemical Weapons
- The Impact of Technological Change
- The Aum Shinrikyo Case Study
- Political and Psychological Effects
- The Problem of Response
- Biological Weapons As Means of Attack
- Categorizing the Biological Threat
- Case Studies: Iraq and Russia
- State Actor, Proxy, and Terrorist/Extremist Incidents to Date
- The Yugoslav Smallpox Incident
- Cases in the United States
- The Lethality and Effectiveness of Current Biological Weapons
- Means of Delivery
- Manufacturing Biological Weapons
- Changes in Technology and the Difficulty of Manufacture
- The Growing Lethality of Biological Weapons and Growing Ease of Manufacture
- New Types of Biological Weapons
- Changes in Disease: Piggybacking on the Threat from Nature
- Agricultural and Ecological Attacks
- The Problem of Response
- Radiological Weapons As Means of Attack
- The Practical Chances of Using Radiological Weapons
- The Practical Risks and Effects of Using Radiological Weapons
- Nuclear Weapons As Means of Attack
- Lethality and Effectiveness
- Is There a Threat from State Actors, Proxies, Terrorists, and Extremists? The Problem of Getting the Weapon
- The Problem of Delivery
- Dealing with the Risk and Impact of Nuclear Attacks
- Chapter 5. Threat Assessment and Prioritization: Identifying Threats
- Dr. Pangloss versus Chicken Little and the Boy Who Cried Wolf
- The Problem of Detection, Warning, and Response
- Living with Complexity and Uncertainty: A Flexible and Evolutionary Approach
- The "Morning After," Multiple Attacks; The "Morning After" and the "Learning Curve Effect"
- Chapter 6. U.S. Government Efforts to Create a Homeland Defense Capability
- Key Presidential Decision Directives and Legislation Affecting the Federal Response
- Ongoing Changes in the Structure of the Federal Effort
- The Growth of the Federal Effort
- The FY2000 Program
- The FY2001 Program
- The Details of the Federal Effort
- The Changing Patterns in Federal Spending
- Planning and Programming the Overall Federal Effort
- Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, and Core Spending
- Spending on Preparedness for Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Chapter 7. Federal Efforts by Department and Agency
- Department of Agriculture
- National Animal Health Emergency Program
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Department of Commerce
- Department of Defense
- Analyzing the Role of the DOD
- The Size of the Current DOD Effort
- Dedicated FY2001 DOD Expenditures for CBRN/WMD Homeland Defense
- Key DOD Activities
- Antiterrorism and Force Protection
- Counterterrorism
- Terrorism Consequence Management
- Specialized DOD Teams and Units for Defense and Response
- Research and Development
- Intelligence
- Counterforce Capability against an Adversary's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Infrastructures
- The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
- Conclusions
- Department of Energy
- Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
- Office of Emergency Management
- Office of Defense Programs
- Office of Emergency Response
- Nuclear Emergency Search Team
- Radiological Assistance Program
- The Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Operations Program
- Research and Development
- Environmental Protection Agency
- Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
- On-Scene Coordinator
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Response and Recovery Directorate
- Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate
- U.S. Fire Administration
- National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute
- General Services Administration
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Metropolitan Medical Response Systems
- National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program
- Public Health Surveillance System for WMD
- Research and Development
- Department of the Interior
- Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation
- National Domestic Preparedness Office
- Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support
- National Domestic Preparedness Consortium
- Awareness of National Security Issues and Response Program
- National Institute of Justice
- National Security Community
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Department of State
- Embassy Protection
- Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
- Bureau of Consular Affairs
- Bureau of Diplomatic Security
- Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
- Export Controls and Homeland Defense
- Arms Control and Homeland Defense
- Department of Transportation
- Department of Treasury
- Department of Veterans Affairs
- Looking Beyond September 2001
- Chapter 8. Federal, State, and Local Cooperation
- Planning for Low- to Mid-Level Terrorism
- West Nile Outbreak
- The Lessons from "Jointness"
- Chapter 9. How Other Nations Deal with These Threats
- Leadership and Management
- Policies and Strategies
- Claimed Reliance on Criminal Prosecution As the Major Response and Deterrent
- Oversight, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
- Resource Allocations Are Targeted at Likely Threats, Not Vulnerabilities: Limited Concern with WMD Threats
- Learning from Foreign Countries
- Chapter 10. Lessons from Recent Major Commissions on Terrorism
- The Gilmore, Bremer, and Hart-Rudman Commissions
- Areas Where the Commissions Made Similar Recommendations
- Gilmore and Bremer Commissions: Executive Coordination and Management
- Gilmore and Bremer Commissions: Congressional Oversight
- Gilmore and Bremer Commissions: Intelligence Gathering and Sharing
- Gilmore and Bremer Commissions: Clarify Authority, Command, and Control
- Bremer and Hart-Rudman Commissions: Biological Pathogens, International Consensus against Terrorism, and Strengthening of Public Health Systems
- Bremer and Hart-Rudman Commissions: Strengthening the International Consensus against Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
- Areas Where the Commissions Made Different Recommendations
- Gilmore Commission: Threat Assessments
- Gilmore Commission: National Strategy for Domestic Preparedness and CBRN Terrorism Response
- Gilmore Commissions: Standardization of Legal Terms
- Gilmore Commission: National Standards for Equipment
- Bremer Commission: Treatment of Former and Future States of Concern
- Bremer Commission: Targeting Terrorist Financial Resources
- Bremer Commission: Liability Insurance
- Bremer Commission: Realistic Exercises
- Chapter 11. Conclusions and Recommendations
- Correcting the Strategic Gaps in the U.S. Approach to Homeland Defense
- Focusing Less on Who's in Charge and More on What They Should Be in Charge of
- Planning for Higher-Probability, Lower-Consequence, and Lower-Probability, Higher-Consequence Events
- Planning for Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare
- Reacting to the Uncertain Nature of the Threat
- The Lack of "Transparency" in Federal Programs
- Effective Action Must Be Broad-Based and Suboptimize Efficiently
- Focusing on Priorities, Programs, and Trade-offs: Creating Effective Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
- Managing Research and Development, Rather Than Treating Asymmetric Attacks, Terrorism, and the CBRN Threat As an Excuse for a "Wish List" and "Slush Fund"
- Looking Beyond CBRN Threats: Dealing with All Medical Risks and Costs, the Need for a Comprehensive Public Information Capability, and the Linkage to Improved Strategic Deterrence and Response Capabilities
- Homeland Defense and/or Law Enforcement
- The Role of the Intelligence Community and the Need for Improved Intelligence
- The Challenge of Operations
- Rule of Law, Human Rights, Asymmetric Warfare, High Levels of Attack, and "New Paradigms"
- The Need for Central Coordination and Management of the Federal Effort
- Broader Solutions and New Approaches to National Strategy: Reacting to Asymmetric Warfare