Review by Choice Review
Newmann (Virginia Commonwealth Univ.) provides a novel approach for understanding US national security decision-making processes in a president's first term. In contrast to other foreign policy models, which focus either on the president's dominant role, the increasing assertiveness of Congress or interest groups, or the competition that takes place among individuals and agencies at the White House, Newmann introduces his "evolutionary" framework. After an impressive discussion and synthesis of previous literature, the author makes a strong argument that all presidents (in varying degrees) move to reassert control within their administration. In his view, other analytical models are too static and fail to recognize that presidents eventually turn to and rely on informal groups and key confidants. The author employs case studies of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, which all address major nuclear and strategic arms control decisions for each president. Newmann highlights Bush as exceptional in overseeing a process that avoided internal political battles and promoted consensus among senior decision-makers. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates to professionals. R. C. Hendrickson Eastern Illinois University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review