Regulating infrastructure : monopoly, contracts, and discretion /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Gómez-Ibáñez, José A., 1948-
Imprint:Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2003.
Description:xi, 431 p. ; 25 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4927272
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ISBN:0674011775 (alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. 361-417) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Monopoly as a Contracting Problem
  • 2. The Choice of Regulatory Strategy
  • I. Regulatory Politics and Dynamics
  • 3. The Behavior of Regulatory Agencies
  • 4. Capture and Instability: Sri Lanka's Buses and U.S. Telephones
  • 5. Incompleteness and Its Consequences: Argentina's Railroads
  • 6. Forestalling Expropriation: Electricity in the Americas
  • II. Contract versus Discretionary Regulation
  • 7. The Evolution of Concession Contracts: Municipal Franchises in North America
  • 8. The Rediscovery of Private Contracts: U.S. Railroad and Airline Deregulation / Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez and John R. Mayer
  • 9. Price-Cap Regulation: The British Water Industry
  • III. Vertical Unbundling and Regulation
  • 10. The Trade-Off in Unbundling: Competition versus Coordination
  • 11. Regulating Coordination: British Railroads
  • 12. Designing Capacity Markets: Electricity in Argentina / Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez and Martin Rodriguez-Pardina
  • 13. The Prospects for Unbundling
  • 14. The Future of Regulation.