The economics of franchising /

The economics of franchising /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Blair, Roger D.
Imprint:New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Description:xii, 338 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Franchises (Retail trade)
Franchises (Retail trade)
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/5637335
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Lafontaine, Francine.
ISBN:0521772524 (alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. 303-319) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Preface to the Hardback Edition
  • Preface to the Paperback Edition
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. What Is a Franchise?
  • 1.2. Traditional and Business-Format Franchising
  • 1.3. In Which Industries Do We Find Franchising?
  • 1.4. Plan of Study
  • 2. Four Popular Misconceptions about Franchising
  • 2.1. Growth: Fact and Fancy
  • 2.2. Entry and Exit
  • 2.3. The Size Distribution of Franchised Chains
  • 2.4. Multi-Unit Franchisees
  • 2.5. Conclusion
  • 3. Franchise Contracts
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. Franchise Fees
  • 3.3. Royalty Rates
  • 3.4. Advertising Fees
  • 3.5. Non-Monetary Contract Clauses
  • 3.6. Some Final Thoughts and Comments
  • 4. Franchising, Vertical Integration, and Vertical Restraints
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. Dual Distribution or Partial Vertical Integration in Franchising
  • 4.3. Contractual Equivalents
  • 4.4. Incentive Issues and Agency Theory
  • 4.5. Conclusion
  • 5. Quality Control
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. A Simple Model of Vertical Externalities
  • 5.3. Contractual Efforts to Resolve Incentive Problems
  • 5.4. Costs of Control
  • 5.5. Observed Quality Differentials between Company and Franchised Units
  • 5.6. Conclusion
  • 6. Franchise Tying Contracts
  • 6.1. Introduction
  • 6.2. Antitrust Treatment of Tying Contracts in General
  • 6.3. Application to Franchise Tying Contracts
  • 6.4. The Kodak Decision and Its Progeny
  • 6.5. Franchise Tying Cases After Kodak
  • 6.6. Identifying Market Power After Kodak
  • 6.7. Post-Contractual Opportunism
  • 6.8. Evaluating Franchise Opportunities
  • 6.9. Conclusion
  • 6.10. Appendix: Vertical Integration and Tying Contracts
  • 7. Vertical Price Controls in Franchising
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. The Legal History of Maximum Resale Price Fixing in the United States
  • 7.3. An Economic Analysis of Maximum Resale Price Restraints
  • 7.4. The Public Policy Implications of Khan
  • 7.5. Conclusion
  • 7.6. Appendix: Sales-Based Royalties and Demand Externalities
  • 8. Encroachment
  • 8.1. Introduction
  • 8.2. Market Coverage and "Traditional" Encroachment
  • 8.3. Industry Responses
  • 8.4. Non-Traditional Encroachment
  • 8.5. Conclusion
  • 8.6. Appendix: Carvel Corporation's Contract: Before and After
  • 9. Advertising and Promotion
  • 9.1. Introduction
  • 9.2. A Simple Model of Advertising as Information
  • 9.3. The Effect of Scale Economies
  • 9.4. Advertising as a Public Good in Franchised Chains
  • 9.5. Advertising in Franchised Chains in Practice
  • 9.6. Franchisor-Franchisee Conflict
  • 9.7. Conclusion
  • 10. Termination and Non-Renewal
  • 10.1. Introduction
  • 10.2. Franchise Contract Duration, Termination, and Renewal: A Look at the Data
  • 10.3. The Role of Duration, Termination, and Non-Renewal in Theory
  • 10.4. Termination and Non-Renewal: Legal Considerations
  • 10.5. Assessing Damages for Wrongful Termination
  • 10.6. Conclusion
  • 11. Concluding Remarks
  • 11.1. Introduction
  • 11.2. A Summary
  • 11.3. International Franchising
  • 11.4. The Future
  • 11.5. Conclusion
  • Articles, Books, and Other Publications
  • Cases, Codes, and Statutes
  • Index

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