Against coherence : truth, probability, and justification /
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| Author / Creator: | Olsson, Erik J. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Oxford [England] : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2005. |
| Description: | xiii, 232 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/5669049 |
Table of Contents:
- 1. Introduction
- Part I. Does Coherence Imply Truth?
- 2. Coherence, Truth, and Testimony
- 2.1. Why Coherence?
- 2.2. Coherence-an Elusive Concept
- 2.3. Pinning down the Coherence Theorist
- 2.4. Truth and Agreement
- 2.5. A Simple Witness Model
- 2.6. Conditions for Convergence
- 2.6.1. Testimonial Independence
- 2.6.2. Individual Credibility
- 2.7. Convergence Parameters
- 2.8. Challenges for the Coherence Theorist
- 3. C. I. Lewis's Radical Justification of Memory
- 3.1. The Problem of Justifying Memory
- 3.2. Lewisian Witness Scenarios
- 3.2.1. Lewis on Witness Corroboration
- 3.2.2. Lewis Scenarios and Surprising Agreement
- 3.2.3. Modelling a Lewis Scenario
- 3.3. Lewis on the Convergence Conditions
- 3.3.1. The Transcendental Argument for Individual Credibility
- 3.3.2. The Verificationist Argument for Individual Credibility
- 3.4. The Individual Credibility 'need not be Assigned'
- 3.5. A Note on Lewis's Definition of Independence
- 4. Laurence BonJour's Radical Justification of Belief
- 4.1. The Problem of Justifying Beliefs
- 4.2. BonJour on Justification from Scratch
- 4.3. Lying and Individual Credibility
- 4.4. Coordinated Lying and Independence
- 4.5. Consequences for BonJour's Anti-scepticism
- 5. C. A. J. Coady's Radical Justification of Natural Testimony
- 5.1. The Problem of Justifying Natural Testimony
- 5.2. Hume's 'Fatal Ambiguity'
- 5.3. The Argument for Individual Credibility
- 5.4. The Invocation of Cohesion and Coherence
- 5.5. Coady's Fatal Ambiguity
- 5.6. Closing Remarks on the Anti-sceptical Use of Coherence
- Part II. Does More Coherence Imply Higher Likelihood of Truth?
- 6. Making the Question Precise
- 6.1. Degrees of Coherence
- 6.2. Coherence and Logical Closure
- 6.3. Testimonial Truth Conduciveness
- 6.4. Why the Klein-Warfield Argument Fails
- 6.5. Testimonial vs. Explanatory Coherence
- 7. A Negative Answer
- 7.1. Independence and Individual Credibility
- 7.2. The Need for a Ceteris Paribus Clause
- 7.3. Should Specificity (Strength) be Held Fixed?
- 7.4. Should Size be Held Fixed?
- 7.5. L. J. Cohen on the Influence of the Prior on the Posterior
- 7.6. The Impossibility of Coherence
- Part III. Other Views
- 8. How not to Regain the Truth Connection: A Reply to Bovens and Hartmann
- 9. Other Coherence Theories
- 9.1. Nicholas Rescher
- 9.2. Donald Davidson
- 9.3. Keith Lehrer
- 9.4. Paul Thagard
- Part IV. Scepticism and Incoherence
- 10. Pragmatism, Doubt, and the Role of Incoherence
- 10.1. Cartesian Scepticism
- 10.2. Jamesian Wagering
- 10.3. Peirce's Reply to Scepticism
- 10.4. More on Incoherence as a Reason for Doubt
- 10.5. Three Roads to Scepticism
- 10.6. Comparison with Other Contemporary Responses
- 10.7. Conclusion
- Appendix A. Counter-example to the Doxastic Extension Principle
- Appendix B. Proof of the Impossibility Theorem
- Appendix C. Proofs of Observations
- References
- Index
