Infrastructure concessions in Latin America : government-led renegotiations /

Infrastructure concessions in Latin America : government-led renegotiations /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Guasch, J. Luis.
Imprint:	Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Dept., 2005.
Description:	44 p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Language:	English
Series:	Policy research working paper ; 3749 Policy research working papers ; 3749.
Subject:	Infrastructure (Economics) -- Latin America -- Case studies. Infrastructure (Economics) Latin America. Case studies.
Format:	E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/5775376

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1947-2004 Straub, Stephane. World Bank. Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Department.
Notes:	"October 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38). Also available on the World Wide Web.
Summary:	The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism.

Description
Item Description:	"October 2005."
Physical Description:	44 p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38).