Practical reasoning and ethical decision /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Audi, Robert, 1941-
Imprint:London ; New York : Routledge, 2006.
Description:xi, 249 p. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/5823435
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0415364620 (hardcover : alk. paper)
0415364639 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. [224]-244) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Part I. Historical and conceptual background: practical reasoning in Aristotle, Hume, and Kant
  • 1. Aristotle on practical reasoning and the structure of action
  • 1. Deliberation
  • 2. The practical syllogism
  • 3. Weakness of will
  • 4. Practical and theoretical reasoning
  • 5. The explanation of action
  • 6. Intrinsically motivated action
  • 7. The structure of action
  • 8. The ultimate ground of action
  • 9. Conclusion
  • 2. Hume and the instrumentalist conception of practical reasoning
  • 1. The instrumental role of reason
  • 2. Reasoning as an element in the genesis of action
  • 3. Reasoning conceived as essentially comparative
  • 4. Reason, rational action, and moral judgment
  • 5. Weakness of will and Humean internalism
  • 6. Humean instrumentalism
  • 7. Conclusion
  • 3. Kant and the autonomy of practical reason
  • 1. Practical reason in the moral sphere
  • 2. Practical reasoning and intention in the application of the Categorical Imperative
  • 3. The motivational and normative power of reason
  • 4. Weakness of will and the conflict between reason and inclination
  • 5. The unity of practical and theoretical reason
  • 6. Conclusion
  • Part II. Practical reasoning, practical arguments, and intentional action
  • 4. The varieties and basic elements of practical reasoning
  • 1. The diversity of practical reasoning
  • 2. Practical reasoning, practical argument, and means-end inference
  • 3. Conclusions of practical reasoning
  • 4. A cognitive-motivational conception of practical reasoning
  • 5. Some basic schemata for representing practical reasoning
  • 6. Practical and theoretical reasoning
  • 7. Practical reasoning and actions for reasons
  • 5. Practical reasoning and intentional action
  • 1. The range of intentional action
  • 2. The phenomenology of reasoning
  • 3. The reconstructive role of practical arguments
  • 4. Inferentialism and the realization of practical arguments
  • 5. Unconscious and self-deceptive elements in practical reasoning
  • 6. Practical reasoning and reasoned action
  • 6. Practical reasoning in the dynamics of action
  • 1. The need for a dynamic account
  • 2. Practical reasoning as a causative process
  • 3. Perceptual and motivational triggers of action
  • 4. Causality, lawlike connections, and intentional action
  • 5. The dynamics of incontinence
  • 6. Causality and freedom
  • Part III. Practical reasoning, ethical decision, and rational action
  • 7. The assessment of practical reasoning
  • 1. The range of criteria for appraising practical reasoning
  • 2. Some patterns of practical reasoning
  • 3. Criteria for assessing practical reasoning
  • 4. A Kantian distinction generalized: basis in, vs. mere conformity with, practical reasoning
  • 5. Some applications of the criteria of assessment
  • 6. The defeasibility of practical reasoning
  • 7. Combination and compositionality in practical reasoning
  • 8. Rationality and relativity
  • 8. General principles of practical appraisal
  • 1. The normative power of moral reasons
  • 2. A range of substantive principles of practical reason and practical reasoning
  • 3. Hypothetical imperatives
  • 4. Three kinds of normative principle
  • 5. Two kinds of inference
  • 6. Toward sound practical principles
  • 9. Practical reasoning and moral judgment
  • 1. Moral judgment and moral decision
  • 2. A framework of moral principles
  • 3. Moral principles as constituents in practical reasoning
  • 4. Normative hierarchies
  • 10. Practical reasoning in ethical decisions
  • 1. The status of moral principles
  • 2. Sketch of a model for making difficult ethical decisions
  • 3. Practical reason, ethical decision, and morally justified action
  • 11. The rationality of action and the plurality of value
  • 1. The connection between practical reasoning and rational action
  • 2. Practical reasoning and rationalization
  • 3. Reasoned action, action for reasons, and normative grounds
  • 4. Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian views of rational action
  • 5. A pluralistic conception of rational action
  • Conclusion
  • Notes
  • Index