Zombies and consciousness /
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| Author / Creator: | Kirk, Robert, 1933- |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2005. |
| Description: | xii, 235 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/5823445 |
Table of Contents:
- 1. Introduction
- 1.1. Two kinds of ignorance about prawns
- 1.2. The zombie idea
- 1.3. Outline
- 2. Zombies and Minimal Physicalism
- 2.1. Causal closure and epiphenomenalism
- 2.2. Redescription and strict implication
- 2.3. More about physicalism and strict implication
- 2.4. A posteriori necessity and physicalism
- 2.5. Psychological and physical explicability
- 2.6. Seeing whether descriptions fit reality, versus looking for analytic connections
- 2.7. Conclusion
- 3. The Case for Zombies
- 3.1. Kinds of zombies
- 3.2. Two old arguments
- 3.3. The argument from conceivability
- 3.4. Does conceivability entail possibility?
- 3.5. Chalmers's arguments for conceivability
- 3.6. The 'knowledge argument'
- 3.7. The argument 'from the absence of analysis'
- 3.8. Conclusion
- 4. Zapping the Zombie Idea
- 4.1. Conflict among intuitions
- 4.2. The jacket fallacy
- 4.3. The e-qualia story
- 4.4. E-qualia, causation, and cognitive processing
- 4.5. Are e-qualia alone enough for epistemic intimacy?
- 4.6. My zombie twin's sole-pictures
- 4.7. The e-qualia story is not conceivable
- 4.8. If zombies were conceivable, the e-qualia story would be conceivable
- 4.9. Objections
- 4.10. Sole-pictures versus soul-pictures
- 4.11. Corollaries
- 4.12. Looking ahead
- 5. What Has To Be Done
- 5.1. Varieties of consciousness
- 5.2. Nagel's two kinds of concepts
- 5.3. Three problems: (i) What is it like? (ii) Is it like anything? (iii) What is it?
- 5.4. Do we have to get a priori from physical facts to what it is like?
- 5.5. Must there be a third type of event?
- 5.6. Block's two concepts of consciousness
- 5.7. Do we need a new science?
- 5.8. Does this project involve 'conceptual analysis'? Does it involve armchair science?
- 5.9. More on the what-is-it problem
- 5.10. The moderate realism of everyday psychology
- 5.11. Summary
- 6. Deciders
- 6.1. What really matters?
- 6.2. Perception and control
- 6.3. Pure reflex systems
- 6.4. Pure reflex systems with acquired stimuli
- 6.5. Built-in triggered reflex systems
- 6.6. Triggered reflex systems with acquired conditions
- 6.7. Monitoring and controlling the responses
- 6.8. Deciders
- 6.9. Unity of the basic package
- 6.10. The basic package and perception
- 6.11. Usefulness of the basic package idea
- 7. Decision, Control, and Integration
- 7.1. Simple organisms
- 7.2. 'Bees can think say scientists'
- 7.3. Interpretation, assessment, and decision-making by the whole organism
- 7.4. The human embryo, foetus, and neonate
- 7.5. The artificial giant
- 7.6. Block's machines
- 7.7. The machine-table robot
- 7.8. Untypical deciders
- 7.9. Other robots
- 7.10. An indeterminate case
- 7.11. Some lessons
- 7.12. Basicness of the basic package
- 8. De-sophisticating the Framework
- 8.1. The objection
- 8.2. The 'concept-exercising and reasoning system'
- 8.3. Concept possession is not all-or-nothing
- 8.4. More on having concepts
- 8.5. Representation
- 8.6. Concepts and theories
- 8.7. Mistaken beliefs and 'public norms'
- 8.8. The basic package and rationality
- 8.9. Deciders might be subjects of experience without being persons
- 8.10. The basic package and 'non-conceptual content'
- 8.11. The contents of deciders' informational states
- 8.12. Conclusion
- 9. Direct Activity
- 9.1. The basic package, control, and consciousness
- 9.2. Why the basic package seems insufficient for perceptual consciousness
- 9.3. The Evans-Type model
- 9.4. Concepts and the acquisition of information
- 9.5. Registration and conceptualization
- 9.6. Two points about information and registration
- 9.7. Directly active perceptual information: instantaneity and priority
- 9.8. A holistic approach to direct activity
- 9.9. Can we really understand direct activity holistically and not in terms of 'poisedness'?
- 9.10. Significance of direct activity
- 9.11. Degrees of consciousness and the richness of perceptual information
- 9.12. Phenomenal consciousness in general
- 9.13. Why is it like this?
- 9.14. Conclusion
- 10. Gap? What Gap?
- 10.1. Extending the sole-pictures argument
- 10.2. Zoë
- 10.3. Being able to tell the difference
- 10.4. Zoë's abilities
- 10.5. Provisional conclusions
- 10.6. Some misconceptions
- 10.7. What this account does
- 10.8. Blindsight
- 10.9. Automatism
- 10.10. General objections to functionalist accounts
- 10.11. The 'explanatory gap'
- 10.12. Awareness of experiences
- 10.13. Carruthers's critique
- 10.14. 'Worldly-subjectivity', 'mental-state subjectivity', and higher-order thought
- 10.15. More objections
- 10.16. Why there will always seem to be a gap
- 11. Survival of the Fittest
- 11.1. Scientific-psychological and neuroscientific accounts
- 11.2. Dualism and physicalism
- 11.3. Wittgenstein and Sartre
- 11.4. Behaviourism
- 11.5. Other functionalisms
- 11.6. Dennett on 'multiple drafts' and 'Joycean machines'
- 11.7. Pure representationalism
- 11.8. Higher-order perception
- 11.9. Higher-order thought
- 11.10. Core points
- Bibliography
- Index