The almost impossible ally : Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle /

The dominant theme in this stellar work is the Anglo-French rivalry involving Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle from 1943 to 1963. Macmillan was the "pragmatic Realist," determined to implement his policies. De Gaulle was self-righteous in "imposing his will on events." Their relationship began in Algiers in 1943, when Macmillan, as resident minister, assisted de Gaulle in becoming head of the French provisional government. De Gaulle was identified with preserving France's interests in Europe's future, and favored a united Europe with France as the dominant power. He was suspicious of US power allying with the UK, promoting an imbalance in the European community. Macmillan wanted the UK to maintain the balance of power and "to have Europe within the Atlantic community." His "Grand Design" was to have a UK/Commonwealth membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) and to participate in the Free Trade Area, but de Gaulle vetoed these efforts. The Macmillan/de Gaulle rivalry became intense in the 1960s. The EEC was France's sphere of influence, and it would be a counterweight against the US. De Gaulle's tactics, preceded by the U-2 incident, also undermined Macmillan's Paris summit conference in 1963. Mangold (St. Antony's College, Oxford) concludes that de Gaulle outmaneuvered Macmillan, leading to his political decline. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. Graduate students/faculty. C. A. Gliozzo Michigan State University