Thought experiments /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Sorensen, Roy A.
Imprint:Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1998, c1992.
Description:xii, 320 p. : ill.
Language:English
Series:Oxford scholarship online.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/6109173
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:019507422X
019512913X (pbk)
Notes:First published in 1992.
First Issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1998.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Electronic reproduction. [Oxford] : Oxford University Press. (Oxford scholarship online). Mode of access: World Wide Web. Access restricted to subscribing institutions. Web site shows publication date of 1999.
Standard no.:9780195129137
Table of Contents:
  • Introduction
  • 1.. Our Most Curious Device
  • I. The Instrument of Choice
  • II. Scientific Thought Experiments
  • III. The Bridge to Philosophical Thought Experiments
  • IV. Analytic Philosophy's Commitment to Thought Experiment
  • 2.. Scepticism About Thought Experiments
  • I. Introspection on the Sly?
  • A.. The Internal Horizon
  • B.. Complaints About Introspection
  • C.. The Parallel Plight of Thought Experiments
  • II. A Repackaged Appeal to Ordinary Language?
  • A.. How the Appeal to Ordinary Language Is Supposed to Work
  • B.. Strong Scepticism About the Appeal to Ordinary Language
  • C.. Moderate Scepticism About the Appeal to Ordinary Language
  • D.. Semantic Descent to Thought Experiments
  • III. Thought Experiments and the Dilemma of Informativeness
  • 3.. Mach and Inner Cognitive Africa
  • I. Instinctive Knowledge
  • II. The Continuum of Cognitive Bargain Hunters
  • III. Mach's Response to the Problem of Informativeness
  • IV. Appraisal of Mach
  • A.. What Mach Got Right
  • B.. What Mach Got Wrong
  • 4.. The Wonder of Armchair Inquiry
  • I. The Pseudoanomaly
  • A.. Modal Gap Illusions
  • B.. How Thought Experiments Yield Modal Conclusions
  • II. Positive Theories of Armchair Inquiry
  • A.. The Recollection Model
  • B.. The Transformation Model
  • C.. The Homuncular Model
  • D.. The Rearrangement Model
  • III. The Cleansing Model
  • A.. How Thought Experiment Corrects Imbalances
  • B.. Theoretical and Practical Irrationality
  • IV. An Eclectic View of the Mechanics of Thought Experiment
  • 5.. Kuhntradictions
  • I. Kuhn on the Received Opinion
  • II. Misfits
  • III. The Left Hand of Logic
  • IV. Truth or Dare?
  • A.. The Incoherence of Incoherent Concepts
  • B.. Violation of Logical Conservatism
  • V. Reconstruction of Kuhn's Error
  • A.. The Guts of Paradox
  • B.. Conflationary Factors
  • C.. The Phenomenology of Inconsistency
  • D.. Counteranalysis of Kuhn's Cases
  • E.. Taxonomic Prospects
  • 6.. The Logical Structure of Thought Experiment
  • I. Attributing Thought Experiments
  • II. Thought Experiments as Alethic Refuters
  • A.. Necessity Refuters
  • B.. The Five Responses to the Quintet
  • C.. Summary of Necessity Refuters
  • D.. Possibility Refuters
  • E.. Summary of Possibility Refuters
  • III. The Identity Conditions for Thought Experiments
  • IV. An Extension to Ordinary Experiments
  • V. The Big Picture
  • 7.. Conflict Vagueness and Precisification
  • I. General Features of Vagueness
  • II. Dueling Definitions
  • A.. The Psychology of Conflict Vagueness
  • B.. How Conflict Vagueness Creates the Mirage of Local Incoherence
  • C.. Extensional Conflict Vagueness
  • D.. Intensional Conflict Vagueness
  • III. Application of the Quintet Schema
  • IV. Conceptual Reform
  • V. Eliminative Reactions to Conflict Vagueness
  • VI. Tolerating the Vagueness
  • VII. Extending the Analysis
  • VIII. Sunder, Enlighten!
  • 8.. The Evolution of Thought Experiment
  • I. 'Experiment' Defined
  • A.. Stereotypical Features of Experiment
  • B.. A Cognitive Aim Is Essential to Experiment
  • II. Execution Is an Optional Part of Experiment
  • III. The Progression from Experiment to Thought Experiment
  • IV. Classifying Thought Experiments by Grounds for Inaction
  • A.. Unimprovables
  • B.. Unaffordables
  • C.. Impossibles
  • V. The Immigration of the Supposition Operator
  • VI. A Definition of 'Thought Experiment'
  • A.. The Selectivity of the Definition
  • B.. Stereotypical Features of Thought Experiments
  • VII. Verbal Disputes over 'Thought Experiment'
  • VIII. Five Theses Recapitulated
  • 9.. Are Thought Experiments Experiments?
  • I. Systematically Misleading Expressions
  • II. Comparisons with Lookalikes
  • A.. Imaginary Experiments
  • B.. Fictional Experiments
  • C.. Mythical Experiments
  • D.. Models, Simulations, Reenactments
  • III. The Analogy with Ordinary Experiments
  • A.. The Taxonomic Point of the Analogy
  • B.. Points of Resemblance
  • C.. Points of Difference
  • D.. Bogus Points of Difference
  • IV. A Lopsided Tally
  • 10.. Fallacies and Antifallacies
  • I. The Biological Baseline
  • II. Myths and Abuses
  • III. Fallacious Thought Experiments
  • A.. Missupposition
  • B.. Perspectival Illusions
  • C.. Framing Effects
  • D.. Biases of Thought Experiment
  • E.. Jumping the If/Ought Gap
  • F.. Overweighting Negative Thought Experiments
  • G.. The Additive Fallacy
  • H.. The Blindspot Fallacy
  • IV. Antifallacies
  • A.. General Characterization of Antifallacies
  • B.. The Far Out Antifallacy
  • C.. Strangeness In, Strangeness Out?
  • D.. The Voyeur Antifallacy
  • E.. The Kabuki Antifallacy
  • V. A Parting Comparison
  • Notes
  • Select Bibliography
  • Subject Index
  • Name Index