Seeing the invisible : national security intelligence in an uncertain age /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Quiggin, Thomas.
Imprint:Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ : World Scientific ; Singapore : S. Rajaratham School of International Studies, c2007.
Description:xvi, 246 p. ; 23 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/6374426
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9789812704825 (pbk.)
9812704825 (pbk.)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. [239]-242) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Foreword
  • Preface
  • 1. The Plan of the Book
  • 1.1. Introduction
  • 1.2. The Outline of the Book
  • 2. Understanding National Security
  • 2.1. The Changing Role of the State
  • 2.2. The State and Globalization
  • 2.3. Other Globalization Actors
  • 2.4. Global and Local Identities
  • 2.5. The Complex Security Environment
  • 2.6. The Asymmetric Threats
  • 2.7. Transnational Organized Crime as a National Security Threat
  • 2.8. Current State Responses
  • 2.9. The Future Role of National Security
  • 3. The Complex and Uncertain International Security Environment
  • 3.1. Threats, Risks and Vulnerability
  • 3.2. Types of Threat Actors
  • 3.3. The Fragility of the Developed States
  • 3.4. Converging Technology Trends and the Threat Environment
  • 3.5. Complexity and Uncertainty in the International System
  • 3.6. Predicting the Future
  • 4. Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Surprise Attacks
  • 4.1. Underlying Themes
  • 4.2. Definitions
  • 4.3. Data, Information, Knowledge and Assessment
  • 4.4. The Intelligence Cycle: Direction, Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination
  • 4.5. Strategic Surprise and Predictability
  • 4.6. The Need for Strategic intelligence Theory
  • 5. Ancient and Modern Assessments: Common Problems
  • 5.1. The Ancients and Strategic Surprise
  • 5.2. Knowledge and Assessment Failures in Ancient Times
  • 5.3. Modern Literature and the Study of Intelligence
  • 5.4. Categories
  • 5.5. The State of Strategic Intelligence Assessment
  • 6. Reinforcing Intelligence Failures
  • 6.1. The Academic Response
  • 6.2. Strategic Assessment and Terrorism
  • 6.3. Reinforcing Failure
  • 7. Technology and Intelligence
  • 7.1. The Outlook
  • 7.2. A Lack of Balance in Resources
  • 7.3. The Militarization of Intelligence
  • 7.4. Secrecy Undermines the Analytical Process
  • 7.5. A Lack of Training and Upgrading
  • 7.6. Outlook and Conclusions
  • 8. Structure and Organization: The Weakness of Centralized Intelligence
  • 9. Faint Signals
  • 9.1. The Case of the Flying Telephone Pole
  • 9.2. The Case of the Missed Declaration of War
  • 9.3. The Case of the Missed Diplomatic Signals
  • 9.4. Conclusions
  • 10. More Faint Signals Being Missed?
  • 10.1. The Case of Animal Disease and Pandemics
  • 10.2. The Case of Technology Trends and Home Made Weapons
  • 10.3. The Case of Bangladesh
  • 10.4. The Case of the United States and Information Sharing
  • 10.5. The Case of Nano Technologies
  • 11. National Security Intelligence and the Front Line Requirements
  • 12. Open Source Intelligence
  • 12.1. OSINT and National Security
  • 12.2. What Constitutes Open Source Intelligence?
  • 12.3. Secrecy is the Enemy of Knowledge
  • 12.4. The Private Sector has More Information and Expertise
  • 12.5. Contingencies and Surprises
  • 12.6. OSINT and Information Flexibility
  • 12.7. Limitations of Classified Intelligence
  • 12.8. OSINT and Reliability
  • 12.9. High Resolution Space-Based Open Source Imagery
  • 12.10. Global Tracking of Issues
  • 12.11. Outlook and Conclusions
  • 13. Anticipating Future Threats: The Problem Areas
  • 13.1. Predicting the Future
  • 13.2. The Changing Role of the State and National Security
  • 13.3. The Complex and Uncertain Environment
  • 13.4. Technology and Future Intelligence
  • 13.5. Traditional Methods of Strategic Intelligence Warning
  • 13.6. Artificial Intelligence?
  • 14. Anticipating Future Threats: The Areas of Strength
  • 14.1. Resiliency and Efficiency
  • 14.2. Diverse Views or Consensus?
  • 14.3. Asymmetric Threats and Knowledge
  • 14.4. Knowledge Workers and Small Groups
  • 14.5. Order and Choice
  • 14.6. Outlook and Conclusions
  • 15. The Singapore Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Process
  • 15.1. Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning
  • 15.2. Interview with Ambassador Lam Chuan Leong
  • 15.3. Interview with Civil Service Head Mr. Peter Ho
  • 15.4. Interview with Mr. Dave Snowden of Cognitive Edge
  • 16. Rethinking National Security Intelligence
  • 16.1. An Intelligent Future for Strategic Intelligence
  • 16.2. The Changing Role of the State
  • 16.3. National Security Must be a Public Issue
  • 16.4. The Future Cannot be Predicted, but it Can be Anticipated
  • 16.5. Faint Signal Detection
  • 16.6. Emerging Threats are Asymmetric in Nature
  • 16.7. Diversity is the Key
  • 16.8. Humans are not Rational Decision Makers
  • 16.9. Government is not a Business
  • 16.10. Open Source Intelligence is Critical
  • 16.11. Education is Required
  • 16.12. Short Term Future - A Bit Bleak in Some States
  • 16.13. Methodology is not Critical
  • 16.14. Digital and Analogue
  • 16.15. The Future Could be Bright
  • 16.16. The Future of Intelligence?
  • Appendix. A National Security and Education: Thinking Across the Boundaries of Time and Specialization
  • Bibliography
  • Index