Human nature : the categorial framework /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Hacker, P. M. S. (Peter Michael Stephan)
Imprint:Malden, MA ; Oxford : Blackwell Pub., 2007.
Description:xii, 326 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/6494785
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ISBN:1405147288 (hbk. : alk. paper)
9781405147286 (hbk. : alk. paper)
Notes:Includes index.
Table of Contents:
  • Preface
  • Part I. The Project
  • 1. Human Nature
  • 2. Philosophical Anthropology
  • 3. Grammatical Investigation
  • 4. Philosophical Investigation
  • 5. Philosophy and æMere WordsÆ
  • 6. A Challenge to the Autonomy of the Philosophical Enterprise: Quine
  • 7. The Platonic and the Aristotelian Traditions in Philosophical Anthropology
  • Part II. Substance
  • 1. Substances: Things
  • 2. Substances: Stuffs
  • 3. Substance-referring Expressions
  • 4. Conceptual Connections between Things and Stuffs
  • 5. Substances and their Substantial parts
  • 6. Substances Conceived as Natural Kinds
  • 7. Substances Conceived as a Common Logico-linguistic Category
  • 8. A Historical Digression: Misconceptions of the Category of Substance
  • Part III. Causation
  • 1. Causation: Humean, Neo-Humean and Anti-Humean
  • 2. On Causal Necessity
  • 3. Event Causation is not a Prototype
  • 4. The Inadequacy of HumeÆs Analysis: Observability, Spatio-temporal Relations, and Regularity
  • 5. The Flaw in the Early Modern Debate
  • 6. Agent Causation as Prototype
  • 7. Agent Causation is Only a Prototype
  • 8. Event Causation and Other Centres of Variation
  • 9. Overview
  • Part IV. Powers
  • 1. Possibility
  • 2. Powers of the Inanimate
  • 3. Active and Passive Powers of the Inanimate
  • 4. Power and its Actualization
  • 5. Power and its Vehicle
  • 6. First- and Second-order Powers; Loss of Power
  • 7. Human Powers: Basic Distinctions
  • 8. Human Powers: Further Distinctions
  • 9. Dispositions
  • Part V. Agency
  • 1. Inanimate Agents
  • 2. Inanimate Needs
  • 3. Animate Agents: Needs and Wants
  • 4. Volitional Agency: Preliminaries
  • 5. Doings, Acts and Actions
  • 6. Human Agency and Action
  • 7. A Historical Overview
  • 8. Human Action as Agential Causation of Movement
  • Part VI. Teleology and Teleological Explanation
  • 1. Teleology and Purpose
  • 2. What Things have a Purpose?
  • 3. Purpose and Axiology
  • 4. The Beneficial
  • 5. A Historical Digression: Teleology and Causality
  • Part VII. Reasons and Explanation of Human Action
  • 1. Rationality and Reasonableness
  • 2. Reason, Reasoning and Reasons
  • 3. Explaining Human Behaviour
  • 4. Explanation in Terms of Agential Reasons
  • 5. Causal Mythologies
  • Part VIII. The Mind
  • 1. Homo loquens
  • 2. The Cartesian Mind
  • 3. The Nature of the Mind
  • Part IX. The Self and the Body
  • 1. The Emergence of the PhilosophersÆ Self
  • 2. The Illusions of the PhilosophersÆ Self
  • 3. The Body
  • 4. The Relationship between Human Beings and their Bodies
  • Part X. The Person
  • 1. The Emergence of the Concept
  • 2. An Unholy Trinity: Descartes, Locke and Hume
  • 3. Changing Bodies and Switching Brains: Puzzle Cases and Red Herrings
  • 4. The Concept of a Person
  • Index