Lost years : Bush, Sharon, and failure in the Middle East /

A journalist with many years of experience writing about the Middle East for the Baltimore Sun, Matthews offers a well-researched but notably completely undocumented perspective on George W. Bush's foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict from his inauguration until early 2007. America's most stalwart ally in the region, Israel, was headed by Ariel Sharon, who seemed to share some personality traits with Bush, notably a strong sense of certainty and purpose. However, Sharon's interactions with Bush frequently complicated American policy objectives. Matthews also discusses the role of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, the powerful pro-Israel lobby, and its ability to bring pressure on the American decision-making process. Palestinian leadership, it is argued, was hampered by the image Yasir Arafat presented to the US State Department as well as the Israelis. In the end, without a measured and constant American involvement to bring about constructive engagement between the Israelis and Palestinians, the domestic intricacies of both parties and overall regional chaos has not permitted American foreign policy to achieve much success in gaining a negotiated settlement. Summing Up: Recommended. General readers, all undergraduates through practitioners. S. R. Silverburg Catawba College

In the closing months of the Clinton administration, an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement seemed tantalizingly close. But now that sustained peace appears further away than ever, it is perhaps natural to speak of the failure of the policy of the Bush administration. Journalist Matthews provides a thoughtful but sometimes unfair critique of Bush's involvement (or lack of involvement) in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In essence, Matthews asserts that American endorsement of virtually all Israeli actions under the guise of  self-defense, or fighting terrorism, undermined our role as an honest broker. For example, Bush was the first American president to explicitly state that Israel could retain some settlements in an agreement. Matthews also points out several missed opportunities in which a more engaged administration could have broken the deadlock. Still, his analysis of the current situation, with Iran now a player in the conflict via its support of Hamas, is both incisive and disturbing. This is a valuable but hardly hopeful examination.--Freeman, Jay Copyright 2007 Booklist

Matthews, who covered the Middle East for the Baltimore Sun, documents the changes that the rise of George W. Bush and Ariel Sharon brought to the American-Israeli relationship in this ambitious journalistic effort. As earlier prospects for negotiations with Palestinians receded into the background, the two leaders pursued ambitious, sometimes conflicting and ultimately ill-fated plans to advance their interests unilaterally, a development which, in Matthews's analysis, reduced the chances for peace. Quoting extensively from politicians, military personnel and others in the U.S., Israel, the Palestinian territories and international organizations, Matthews offers a balanced, if opinionated, view of the conflict and of the major personalities that have shaped it. While the author paints relatively sympathetic portraits of Bush and Sharon, he is far less sanguine about the causes they have chosen to endorse, deploring missed opportunities to implement a two-state solution. He particularly faults Bush's grandiose visions of regime change and democracy promotion for weakening America's hand. Though numerous details and anecdotes provide more padding than relevance, Matthews's account remains readable and offers much of interest to the student of Israeli or American politics. (Sept.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

Peace in the Middle East is one of the world's great desiderata, and the Bush administration professes to want it. Why, then, asks former Baltimore Sun correspondent Matthews, is the prospect for peace so dim? In part, he writes, the answer lies in missed opportunities. Even as governor of Texas, Bush was eager to be involved in regional politics, and early on he befriended Ariel Sharon, whom he considered both effective and capable of being influenced. Yet, Matthews continues, in both terms as president, "Bush engaged in the Middle East peace process episodically and without success," ineffectiveness complicated by feuds among his staff over diplomatic and strategic priorities and by the decision, made after 9/11, to snub Yasir Arafat and refuse to admit the Palestinian Authority into deliberations. In part, that decision was determined, Matthews suggests, by calculating the pros and cons of the Jewish vote back home; the Jewish electorate, he writes, "is too small to be decisive in most national elections" but nevertheless has proved important in the swing states, and Bush's father, as president, lost his bid for reelection in part, perhaps, because he lost that vote soundly. Bush II took it upon himself to cultivate close relations with Sharon at the expense of any other, against warnings by Colin Powell and others; one senior State Department spokesperson tells Matthews that the post-9/11 White House gave Sharon "a lot of slack in areas that we could have cared about, but there wasn't anything to be gained by it," one of those areas being, it seems, the Palestinians. Add to that Bush's preferring doctrine-driven neocons such as Paul Wolfowitz and Elliott Abrams to more balanced views--"Had Condi understood the region more, she never would have accepted [the appointment of Abrams]," Brent Scowcroft remarked--and the little matter of the war in Iraq, it is no surprise that peace remains a distant possibility. Valuable reporting on a profoundly important question. Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.