Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Langer, Jurian.
Imprint:Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands : Kluwer Law International ; Frederick, MD : Sold and distributed in North, Central, and South America by Aspen Publishers Inc., c2007.
Description:xxvii, 266 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Language:English
Series:International competition law series ; v. 30
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/6648410
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ISBN:9041125752
9789041125750
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. [241]-256) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Introduction
  • 1. The Challenges of Modernization
  • 2. The Object and Scope of This Book
  • 3. Outline of the Book
  • Part I. General Aspects of Tying and Bundling
  • Chapter 1. The Economics of Tying and Bundling
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Categorisation of Tying and Bundling
  • 3. Efficiency Motivations
  • 4. Anti- Competitive Motivations
  • 5. Special Topics in Relation to Tying and Bundling
  • 6. What are the Legal Implications of the Economics Literature?
  • 7. Conclusions
  • Chapter 2. The Leveraging Theory in General under US and EC Law
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Connection between Dominance and Abuse
  • 3. Comparing the US and EC Model
  • 4. The Legal Position of the Multi-Market Requirement
  • 5. Discussion of the Multi-Market Scenarios under EC Law
  • 6. Conclusions
  • Part II. Ex Post Regulation
  • Chapter 3. Tying and Bundling under US Antitrust Law
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. A Trilogy of Antitrust Scrutiny
  • 3. The Chequered History of Bundling Analysis
  • 4. The Separate-Product Issue
  • 5. Discussion of the Legal Standard for Tying and Bundling
  • 6. Efficiencies due to Tying and Bundling
  • 7. Conclusions
  • Chapter 4. Tying and Bundling under EC Law
  • 1. A Dual System of Ex Post Rules
  • 2. General Observations Regarding Tying and Bundling
  • 3. A Critical-Historical Overview
  • 4. The Separate-Product Issue
  • 5. Legal-Economic Analysis of the Community Trilogy on Tying and Bundling
  • 6. Choosing a Standard for Tying and Bundling
  • 7. Conclusions
  • Part III. Ex Ante Regulation
  • Chapter 5. Tying and Bundling under US and EC Merger Control
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. An Outline of the US and EC Merger Rules
  • 3. Tying and Bundling under US Law
  • 4. The EC Approach Towards Tying and Bundling Concerns
  • 5. Evaluation of the Theory of Leveraging Harm
  • 6. Conclusions
  • Conclusions
  • 1. Introductory Remarks
  • 2. There are Convergences and Divergences between US and EC Law
  • 3. Economics as a Useful tool for the Analysis of Tying and Bundling
  • 4. A Structured Effects-Based Rule of Reason Test
  • 5. A Preference for ex post Control
  • 6. A Critical Examination of the Tying and Bundling Trilogy
  • 7. The Commission's Discussion Paper on Article 82
  • Bibliography
  • Table of cases
  • Index