Vietnam's forgotten army : heroism and betrayal in the ARVN /

The Vietnam War still fascinates readers. Although scholars have dissected the varied components of the conflict, there are few studies that have embarked on a detailed analysis of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, better known to area experts as the ARVN. Wiest, co director of the Center for War and Society at the Univ. of Southern Mississippi, has written a unique study blending history and biography to tell the narrative of two men, one a hero, and the other a defector, whose stories dramatize the tragic history of the US venture in Southeast Asia. By 1970, Tran Ngoc Hue and Pham Van Dinh had impressive careers and were rising stars in the Vietnamese army. Suddenly, their fortunes changed following Vietnamization and the progressive withdrawal of US forces. Hue was critically wounded and captured during the ill-fated 1971 ARVN offensive in Laos, Lom Song 719, while Dinh, commanding an ARVN regiment, surrendered his unit during the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive in 1972. Relying on interviews and official records, Wiest weaves an engrossing story of heroism and betrayal that chronicles a long-forgotten episode in the US's longest war. Summing Up: Recommended. All levels/libraries. C. C. Lovett Emporia State University

This sympathetic biography of Pham Van Dinh and Tran Ngoc Hue, mid-level officers in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), provides a unique perspective among American war histories. Built by American advisers in 1955 to repel a conventional invasion, the ARVN was a Western-style force that actually spent most of its 25-year life battling a lightly armed insurgency. Ironically, its destruction came at the hands of a traditional invading army from North Vietnam, but by this time U.S. forces (which it had relied on for heavy artillery and airpower) were gone. Vietnam's army suffered a chronic lack of imaginative leadership at the top, yet historian Wiest (Haig) makes a good case that it often fought well, especially at the battalion and regimental level, when led by good officers such as Dinh and Hue. Wiest describes their energetic leadership as the war intensified during the 1960s, but it is not a story that ends happily. Hue spent 13 years in a North Vietnamese prison after his capture in 1970. Dinh surrendered his regiment in 1972, finishing his career in the NVA. Readers who persist through dense nuts-and-bolts battle descriptions will gain new respect for the mishandled South Vietnamese army. (Dec.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

This is a fascinating study of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)-the South Vietnamese army-during America's involvement in the Vietnam War. Historian Wiest (Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited) focuses on two ARVN officers, Tran Ngoc Hue and Pham Van Dinh, and their parallel but ultimately divergent paths as successful young officers who demonstrated extraordinary courage and tactical skill, painting them as symbolizing the best hope for victory against the Communists. However, they both believed that South Vietnam was doomed to lose the war. Hue continued to fight, was captured by the North Vietnamese in 1971, and spent years in virtual poverty until he migrated to the United States, where he was perceived as a hero. Dinh, hoping to save the lives of his men, surrendered to Communist forces in 1972, defected to their side, and was seen as a traitor by most South Vietnamese emigres. Wiest argues that had American strategy focused more on enabling the arvin and had U.S. troops not been withdrawn so quickly, the war might have been won. This well-written, compassionate study is a major contribution to most libraries.-A.O. Edmonds, Ball State Univ., Muncie, IN (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Admiring biography of two officers in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), which fought far better than most American histories have acknowledged. Vietnam has a long martial tradition, writes military historian Wiest (Haig: The Evolution of a Commander, 2005, etc.), so there was no shortage of young men eager for a military career when ARVN was created in the 1950s. They fought for 25 years and suffered more than 200,000 casualties, laboring under two critical flaws. Vietnamese leaders wanted a lightly armed, mobile anti-insurgency force, but American military advisors insisted on a heavily armed, Western-style army dependent on the United States for equipment and logistics. In addition, Vietnamese rulers relied on the army to remain in power, so they chose senior officers for loyalty rather than competence. Despite this, good commanders existed, and some ARVN units fought well. Wiest tells the story of two officers, Pham Van Dinh and Tran Ngoc Hue, who led their units with courage and energy well documented in reports from American advisors who worked with them. Hue was captured during the disastrous invasion of Laos in 1970 and spent 13 years in North Vietnamese prisons. Dinh switched sides during the equally disastrous 1972 Easter Offensive and served in the North Vietnamese Army until his retirement. The author spends a great deal of time describing the fighting. While several hundred pages on small-unit actions will interest only military buffs, they present the war from the unfamiliar point of view of the Vietnamese. For example, ARVN did much of the fighting in the epic 1968 battle for the Citadel of Hue City, but saw Vietnamese contributions downplayed by American journalists more interested in depicting heroic Marines. The later offensives make painful reading as lack of good generalship and absence of American firepower undid the efforts of many brave Vietnamese soldiers. A unique perspective on the Vietnam War, though no less depressing than the old one. Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.