Review by Choice Review
Flynn (Arizona State Univ.) proceeds from the popular premise that the George W. Bush administration failed to gain the moral high ground when attempting to justify its 2003 invasion of Iraq. Placing that war side by side with nine others waged on the pretext of national self-preservation, the author seeks to provide a broader historical context. Encountered along the way are three challenges to disinterested scholarly investigation, of which presentism is only the first. More problematic is the ethical no man's land between preemption of an imminent attack and prevention of one's known enemy from gaining the position and strength to inflict later damage. Given that preemption and prevention are not mutually exclusive concepts, Flynn's tendency to argue in black and white--with very little gray--stands out despite a disclaimer in the preface. In excusing preemption and condemning prevention, one encounters a third challenge: the inclination of would-be excusers and condemners to think the mighty incapable of justifiable violence, and the weak incapable of anything but. Readers who take the author to task on the first two issues will concede that he has mastered the third, although many will find his characterization of Israel's 1967 "war of aggression" (p. 201) wide of the mark. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. J. Daley Pittsburg State University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
