The owl of Minerva : essays on human rights /
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Author / Creator: | Zupančič, Boštjan M. |
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Imprint: | Utrecht, The Netherlands : Eleven International Pub., c2008. |
Description: | xiv, 448 p. ; 25 cm. |
Language: | English |
Subject: | |
Format: | Print Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/7310317 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- Section I. Human Rights in the Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure
- Chapter 1. Introduction
- Chapter 2. Adjudication and the Rule of Law
- 1. From Combat to Contract: What Does the Constitution Constitute?
- 2. Adjudication as the Surrogate of Force and Violence
- 3. 'Rule of Law' and 'Law and Order' Necessitate each other
- 4. Substantive and Procedural Law
- Chapter 3. Truthfinding and Impartiality in the Criminal Process
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Difference Between Civil and Criminal Procedures
- 3. The Criminal Process: Conflict Resolution or Truthfinding?
- 4. The Incompatibility Between Truthfinding (Investigation) and Impartiality (Adversariness)
- 4.1. Investigation and (Im)partiality
- 4.1.1. The Procrustean Tendency
- 4.2. Adjudication and Impartiality
- 4.2.1. Impartiality and the Criteria of Essentiality
- 5. Conclusion
- Chapter 4. The Crown and the Criminal: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
- 1. The Privilege as a Human Right
- 2. The Logic of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
- 3. On the Power to Make Crimes
- 4. The Procedural Principle of Legality
- 4.1. Autonomous and Ancillary Procedures
- 4.2. Procedural Sanctioning
- 4.2.1. The Need for Procedural Rights
- 4.2.2. The Need for Procedural Sanctioning
- 4.2.3. Sanctioning in Substantive Fashion
- 4.2.4. Sanctioning by Procedural Fashion
- 4.2.5. Impact on Outcome
- 4.2.6. Importance of Issue, Truth and Impartiality
- 4.3. The Procedural Principle of Legality
- 5. Exclusionary Rule: The Alter-Ego of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
- 5.1. Origin
- 5.2. Scope
- 5.3. Is the Rule Prescriptive or Instrumental
- 5.4. Comparative and International Aspects
- 6. An Analysis of the Substantive Definition of Torture Deriving From Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture
- 6.1. The Definition of Torture as per Article 1(1) of the Convention
- 6.2. Elements of the Definition of Torture as a Criminal Offence (Corpus Delicti)
- 7. Presumption of Innocence
- 8. Conclusion
- Chapter 5. Plea Bargaining
- Chapter 6. Conclusion
- Section II. Human Rights in the Context of Substantive Criminal Law
- Chapter 7. Introduction
- Chapter 8. Beccaria: Theories on Punishment and Legal Formalism
- 1. On Punishment
- 1.1. The Origin of Punishments and the Right to Punish
- 1.2. Mildness of Punishments
- 1.3. Promptness and Certainty of Punishment
- 2. On Legal Formalism and Interpretation of Rules
- 2.1. Interpretation of the Laws
- 2.2. Obscurity of the Laws
- 2.1.1. Conciseness
- 2.1.2. The Fixed Nature of the Law
- 3. Conclusion
- Chapter 9. Punishment and its Influence on Normative Integration
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Paradox of Punishment
- 3. Anomie, Punishment and Effects on Normative Integration
- 3.1. Theory of Punishment
- 3.2. Psychological Aspect of Normative Integration
- 3.3. Sociological Aspect of Normative Integration
- 3.3.1. Durkheim's Theory of Collective Conscience
- 3.3.2. Mead and his Theory of Punitive Justice
- 3.3.3. Social Stability Through the Intercession of Punishment
- 3.3.4. Normative Integration Through the Intercession of Legal Process
- 4. Safeguards: Human Rights and the New Methods of Punishment
- 5. Conclusion
- Chapter 10. On Legal Formalism: The Principle of Legality in Criminal Law
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Nature of Legal Concepts, Norms or Rules
- 2.1. Scientific Norms vs. Legal Norms
- 2.2. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Norms
- 2.3. The Negation of Norms
- 3. Concept and Reality
- 3.1. André-Vincent and Engisch
- 3.2. The Positivist Position
- 3.3. The Normative-Systematic Position
- 3.4. Hegel and Marx
- 3.5. Unger
- 4. The Principle of Legality
- 4.1. The Dialectic or Antinomy of Legal Formalism
- 4.2. Purposive Legal Reasoning
- 4.2.1. Criminal Responsibility under Mistake of Law
- 4.2.1.1. The Limits of Subjectivisation
- 4.2.1.2. The Norm and the Policy
- 4.2.2. The Negative Aspects: Ex Post Facto Laws, Vague Laws and Nonlaws
- 4.2.3. The Positive Aspects: Analogy Lato Sensu and Analogy Inter Legem - Latent Purposive Legal Reasoning
- 4.3. Conflict and Form in Law
- 4.3.1. Conflict and Legal Regulation
- 4.3.2. Conflict and the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law
- 4.4. The Illusion of the Major Premise
- 4.5. The Nature of the Minor Premises
- 4.6. The Problem of the Burden of Proof
- 4.7. Judicial Interpretation
- 4.8. Consequences of the Myth of the Principle of Legality
- 4.8.1. The Continental Criminal System
- 4.8.2. The Anglo-Saxon Criminal System
- 5. Conclusion
- Chapter 11. Conclusion
- Section III. Essays on Human Rights in the Context of International and Constitutional Law
- Chapter 12. On the Interpretation of Legal Precedents and of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
- 1. The Relationship Between Constitutional Courts and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
- 2. Checks and Balances Between the Three Branches of Power
- 3. Interpretation of Legal Precedents and the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
- 3.1. The Doctrine of Precedents
- 3.2. How to Read and Interpret the Judgment
- 3.3. The Erga Omnes Effect of ECHR Law
- 4. The Individual in Litigation with the State
- 4.1. The Individual in Direct Litigation with the State
- 4.2. The Individual in Indirect Litigation with the State
- 5. Conclusion
- Chapter 13. Access to Court as a Human Right According to the European Convention of Human Rights
- 1. Introduction
- 2. 'Access to Court' Doctrine According to the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
- 2.1. Basic Cases Establishing the Doctrine
- 2.1.1. Access to Court According to the Convention
- 2.1.2. The Penumbras and the Umbra of Access to Court
- 2.1.3. Difference Between Civil and Criminal Cases with Respect to Access to Court
- 2.2. Recent Cases
- 3. Some Tentative Conclusions
- Chapter 14. Morality of Virtue vs. Morality of Mere Duty or Why Do Penalties Require Legal Process Whereas Rewards Do Not?
- 1. Fuller's Morality of Duty vs. Morality of Aspiration
- 2. The Function of Legal Formalism and Criteria
- 3. The Centrality of Conflict
- 4. Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index of Authors Cited
- Index of Topics