The owl of Minerva : essays on human rights /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Zupančič, Boštjan M.
Imprint:Utrecht, The Netherlands : Eleven International Pub., c2008.
Description:xiv, 448 p. ; 25 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/7310317
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Shah, Nandini.
ISBN:9789077596470
907759647X
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. 429-440) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Preface
  • Section I. Human Rights in the Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure
  • Chapter 1. Introduction
  • Chapter 2. Adjudication and the Rule of Law
  • 1. From Combat to Contract: What Does the Constitution Constitute?
  • 2. Adjudication as the Surrogate of Force and Violence
  • 3. 'Rule of Law' and 'Law and Order' Necessitate each other
  • 4. Substantive and Procedural Law
  • Chapter 3. Truthfinding and Impartiality in the Criminal Process
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Difference Between Civil and Criminal Procedures
  • 3. The Criminal Process: Conflict Resolution or Truthfinding?
  • 4. The Incompatibility Between Truthfinding (Investigation) and Impartiality (Adversariness)
  • 4.1. Investigation and (Im)partiality
  • 4.1.1. The Procrustean Tendency
  • 4.2. Adjudication and Impartiality
  • 4.2.1. Impartiality and the Criteria of Essentiality
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Chapter 4. The Crown and the Criminal: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
  • 1. The Privilege as a Human Right
  • 2. The Logic of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
  • 3. On the Power to Make Crimes
  • 4. The Procedural Principle of Legality
  • 4.1. Autonomous and Ancillary Procedures
  • 4.2. Procedural Sanctioning
  • 4.2.1. The Need for Procedural Rights
  • 4.2.2. The Need for Procedural Sanctioning
  • 4.2.3. Sanctioning in Substantive Fashion
  • 4.2.4. Sanctioning by Procedural Fashion
  • 4.2.5. Impact on Outcome
  • 4.2.6. Importance of Issue, Truth and Impartiality
  • 4.3. The Procedural Principle of Legality
  • 5. Exclusionary Rule: The Alter-Ego of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
  • 5.1. Origin
  • 5.2. Scope
  • 5.3. Is the Rule Prescriptive or Instrumental
  • 5.4. Comparative and International Aspects
  • 6. An Analysis of the Substantive Definition of Torture Deriving From Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture
  • 6.1. The Definition of Torture as per Article 1(1) of the Convention
  • 6.2. Elements of the Definition of Torture as a Criminal Offence (Corpus Delicti)
  • 7. Presumption of Innocence
  • 8. Conclusion
  • Chapter 5. Plea Bargaining
  • Chapter 6. Conclusion
  • Section II. Human Rights in the Context of Substantive Criminal Law
  • Chapter 7. Introduction
  • Chapter 8. Beccaria: Theories on Punishment and Legal Formalism
  • 1. On Punishment
  • 1.1. The Origin of Punishments and the Right to Punish
  • 1.2. Mildness of Punishments
  • 1.3. Promptness and Certainty of Punishment
  • 2. On Legal Formalism and Interpretation of Rules
  • 2.1. Interpretation of the Laws
  • 2.2. Obscurity of the Laws
  • 2.1.1. Conciseness
  • 2.1.2. The Fixed Nature of the Law
  • 3. Conclusion
  • Chapter 9. Punishment and its Influence on Normative Integration
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Paradox of Punishment
  • 3. Anomie, Punishment and Effects on Normative Integration
  • 3.1. Theory of Punishment
  • 3.2. Psychological Aspect of Normative Integration
  • 3.3. Sociological Aspect of Normative Integration
  • 3.3.1. Durkheim's Theory of Collective Conscience
  • 3.3.2. Mead and his Theory of Punitive Justice
  • 3.3.3. Social Stability Through the Intercession of Punishment
  • 3.3.4. Normative Integration Through the Intercession of Legal Process
  • 4. Safeguards: Human Rights and the New Methods of Punishment
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Chapter 10. On Legal Formalism: The Principle of Legality in Criminal Law
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Nature of Legal Concepts, Norms or Rules
  • 2.1. Scientific Norms vs. Legal Norms
  • 2.2. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Norms
  • 2.3. The Negation of Norms
  • 3. Concept and Reality
  • 3.1. André-Vincent and Engisch
  • 3.2. The Positivist Position
  • 3.3. The Normative-Systematic Position
  • 3.4. Hegel and Marx
  • 3.5. Unger
  • 4. The Principle of Legality
  • 4.1. The Dialectic or Antinomy of Legal Formalism
  • 4.2. Purposive Legal Reasoning
  • 4.2.1. Criminal Responsibility under Mistake of Law
  • 4.2.1.1. The Limits of Subjectivisation
  • 4.2.1.2. The Norm and the Policy
  • 4.2.2. The Negative Aspects: Ex Post Facto Laws, Vague Laws and Nonlaws
  • 4.2.3. The Positive Aspects: Analogy Lato Sensu and Analogy Inter Legem - Latent Purposive Legal Reasoning
  • 4.3. Conflict and Form in Law
  • 4.3.1. Conflict and Legal Regulation
  • 4.3.2. Conflict and the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law
  • 4.4. The Illusion of the Major Premise
  • 4.5. The Nature of the Minor Premises
  • 4.6. The Problem of the Burden of Proof
  • 4.7. Judicial Interpretation
  • 4.8. Consequences of the Myth of the Principle of Legality
  • 4.8.1. The Continental Criminal System
  • 4.8.2. The Anglo-Saxon Criminal System
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Chapter 11. Conclusion
  • Section III. Essays on Human Rights in the Context of International and Constitutional Law
  • Chapter 12. On the Interpretation of Legal Precedents and of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
  • 1. The Relationship Between Constitutional Courts and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
  • 2. Checks and Balances Between the Three Branches of Power
  • 3. Interpretation of Legal Precedents and the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
  • 3.1. The Doctrine of Precedents
  • 3.2. How to Read and Interpret the Judgment
  • 3.3. The Erga Omnes Effect of ECHR Law
  • 4. The Individual in Litigation with the State
  • 4.1. The Individual in Direct Litigation with the State
  • 4.2. The Individual in Indirect Litigation with the State
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Chapter 13. Access to Court as a Human Right According to the European Convention of Human Rights
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. 'Access to Court' Doctrine According to the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
  • 2.1. Basic Cases Establishing the Doctrine
  • 2.1.1. Access to Court According to the Convention
  • 2.1.2. The Penumbras and the Umbra of Access to Court
  • 2.1.3. Difference Between Civil and Criminal Cases with Respect to Access to Court
  • 2.2. Recent Cases
  • 3. Some Tentative Conclusions
  • Chapter 14. Morality of Virtue vs. Morality of Mere Duty or Why Do Penalties Require Legal Process Whereas Rewards Do Not?
  • 1. Fuller's Morality of Duty vs. Morality of Aspiration
  • 2. The Function of Legal Formalism and Criteria
  • 3. The Centrality of Conflict
  • 4. Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Index of Authors Cited
  • Index of Topics