Beyond analytic philosophy : doing justice to what we know /

Conceived along the lines of logical empiricism, analytic philosophy has often been attacked by defenders of traditional metaphysics and philosophical theology. Wang (Rockefeller University) shares the widely held view that analytic philosophy (so conceived) is artificially restrictive to the philosophical enterprise, and he locates its chief weakness in an area where it has generally been deemed to be most successful: logic and the philosophy of mathematics. He argues that the critical shortcoming of analytic philosophy is its inability to give an adequate account of mathematics, and that the reason for this is its commitment to empiricism. Wang examines and criticizes four leading philosophers in the development of an analytic account of mathematics: B. Russell, the early L. Wittgenstein, R. Carnap, and W. Quine. The section on Quine, whom he characterizes as a ``logical negativist,'' will be of special interest. Wang concludes by defending the traditional conception of philosophy as the search for a comprehensive, unified worldview. This is Wang's second major critique of analytic philosophy; his first critique was From Mathematics to Philosophy (1974), Beyond Analytic Philosophy is first of a projected three-volume series designed to articulate his own worldview. Includes references and a lengthy chronological table. Appropriate for upper-division undergraduates and graduate students in philosophy.-S. Andre, California State University, Long Beach