Occupying Iraq : a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority /

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Bibliographic Details
Imprint:Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corp., 2009.
Description:xlvi, 364 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/7712391
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Dobbins, James, 1942-
Coalition Provisional Authority.
International Security and Defense Policy Center.
ISBN:9780833046659 (pbk. : alk. paper)
0833046659 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Notes:"MG-847-CC"--P. [4] of cover.
"The research described in this report was sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division."
Includes bibliographical references (p. 335-340) and index.
Also issued online.
Summary:"The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives: the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. It is based on interviews with many of those responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists' accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents. The book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also addresses the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst." --P. [4] of cover.
Description
Summary:The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives, to include examination of the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This compelling new book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its Administrator, L. Paul Bremer. The book also includes interviews with many of those in Baghdad and Washington responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalist accounts of the period, and on tens of thousands of internal and recently unclassified CPA documents, to which the authors were allowed access.
Item Description:"MG-847-CC"--P. [4] of cover.
"The research described in this report was sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division."
Physical Description:xlvi, 364 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (p. 335-340) and index.
ISBN:9780833046659
0833046659