Hobbesian moral and political theory /

A detailed analytical attempt to construct a consistent theoretical justification for a social contract approach that does not require absolutist rule. While utilizing the Leviathan (1651) almost exclusively as a primary source, the work is a professed departure from Hobbes, for the author suggests that it improves upon Hobbes's. Such approaches should always be suspect. Kavka (University of California, Irvine) has several interesting observations to make, noticeably in the distinction between psychological and predominant egoism as explanatory approaches to Hobbe's idea of the condition of mere nature. The work, however, applies much that is quite foreign to the original theory-especially the heavy application of game theory, which produces no significant insights except to those who enjoy such devices. The use of secondary material is heavily skewed to other analytical philosophers. By the time this volume has been completed, one is introduced more to Kavka's ideas than to those of Hobbes. Definitions are occasionally tautological (``A party has a permission right to do something if any only if it is permissible for him to do it''). The original idea of laws of nature are cast as active prescriptions, rather than (correctly) as negative proscriptions on conduct. Suggested only for graduate students and very advanced undergraduates.- K.F. Moors, Duquesne University