Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Davis, Peter J. (Peter John), 1970-
Imprint:Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2010.
Description:xi, 580 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/7904469
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Garcés, Eliana, 1968-
ISBN:9780691142579 (alk. paper)
0691142572 (alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1. The Determinants of Market Outcomes
  • 1.1. Demand Functions and Demand Elasticities
  • 1.2. Technological Determinants of Market Structure
  • 1.3. Competitive Environments: Perfect Competition, Oligopoly, and Monopoly
  • 1.4. Conclusions
  • 2. Econometrics Review
  • 2.1. Multiple Regression
  • 2.2. Identification of Causal Effects
  • 2.3. Best Practice in Econometric Exercises
  • 2.4. Conclusions
  • 2.5. Annex: Introduction to the Theory of Identification
  • 3. Estimation of Cost Functions
  • 3.1. Accounting and Economic Revenue, Costs, and Profits
  • 3.2. Estimation of Production and Cost Functions
  • 3.3. Alternative Approaches
  • 3.4. Costs and Market Structure
  • 3.5. Conclusions
  • 4. Market Definition
  • 4.1. Basic Concepts in Market Definition
  • 4.2. Price Level Differences and Price Correlations
  • 4.3. Natural Experiments
  • 4.4. Directly Estimating the Substitution Effect
  • 4.5. Using Shipment Data for Geographic Market Definition
  • 4.6. Measuring Pricing Constraints
  • 4.7. Conclusions
  • 5. The Relationship between Market Structure and Price
  • 5.1. Framework for Analyzing the Effect of Market Structure on Prices
  • 5.2. Entry, Exit, and Pricing Power
  • 5.3. Conclusions
  • 6. Identification of Conduct
  • 6.1. The Role of Structural Indicators
  • 6.2. Directly Identifying the Nature of Competition
  • 6.3. Conclusions
  • 6.4. Annex: Identification of Conduct in Differentiated Markets
  • 7. Damage Estimation
  • 7.1. Quantifying Damages of a Cartel
  • 7.2. Quantifying Damages in Abuse of Dominant Position Cases
  • 7.3. Conclusions
  • 8. Merger Simulation
  • 8.1. Best Practice in Merger Simulation
  • 8.2. Introduction to Unilateral Effects
  • 8.3. General Model for Merger Simulation
  • 8.4. Merger Simulation: Coordinated Effects
  • 8.5. Conclusions
  • 9. Demand System Estimation
  • 9.1. Demand System Estimation: Models of Continuous Choice
  • 9.2. Demand System Estimation: Discrete Choice Models
  • 9.3. Demand Estimation in Merger Analysis
  • 9.4. Conclusions
  • 10. Quantitative Assessment of Vertical Restraints and Integration
  • 10.1. Rationales for Vertical Restraints and Integration
  • 10.2. Measuring the Effect of Vertical Restraints
  • 10.3. Conclusions
  • Conclusion
  • References
  • Index