Guarding the guardians : judicial councils and judicial independence /

Guarding the guardians : judicial councils and judicial independence /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Garoupa, Nuno.
Imprint:[Chicago, Ill.] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2008.
Description:1 online resource (39 p.)
Language:English
Series:John M. Olin law & economics working paper ; no. 444 (2d series)
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 250
John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics working paper ; 2nd ser., no. 444
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 250.
Subject:
Judicial independence.
Judicial councils.
Judicial councils.
Judicial independence.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/7919235
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Ginsburg, Tom.
Notes:Title from online title page, viewed Jan. 28. 2010.
"November 2008."
Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:"This Article uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing debate about the selection and discipline of judges. In recent decades, many countries around the world have created judicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance between judicial independence and accountability. Our Article has two aims. First, we provide a theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we test the extent to which different designs of judicial council affect judicial quality. We find that there is little relationship between councils and quality. We also offer a positive explanation for why judicial councils nevertheless remain attractive institutions."

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