Emotions, values and the construction of risk /

Emotions, values and the construction of risk /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Bandes, Susan A., 1951-
Imprint:[Chicago, Ill.] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2008.
Description:1 online resource (29 p.)
Language:English
Series:Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 221
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 221.
Subject:
Risk management -- Decision-making.
Emotions.
Emotions.
Risk management -- Decision making.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/7920861
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:University of Chicago. Law School.
Notes:Title from online title page, viewed Dec. 21, 2009.
"June 2008."
Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:"Dan Kahan's recent article, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, continues a useful exchange between Kahan and Cass Sunstein about the differences between their prominent approaches to risk regulation: Kahan's cultural cognition approach, which inquires into how emotional appraisals of value influence decision making, and Sunstein's heuristics and biases approach, which focuses on the cognitive mechanisms that shape perceptions about risk. A major contribution of Kahan's work has been its insight into the pervasiveness of emotional influences on the decision-making process. The recognition that emotion pervades decision making raises a difficult normative question: how to distinguish the influences that contribute to good judgment from those that distort judgment. This normative question in turn gives rise to a difficult practical question: how to address the influences that cause distortion. In this brief Response, I argue that tackling this evaluative task requires avoiding mirror impulses: emotions should neither be privileged as inherently desirable nor marginalized as inherently irrational. They should be judged based on what they contribute to the cognitive task at hand. The task at hand, as the Kahan/Sunstein debate defines it, is determining how government should regulate risk. In exploring the question of how this task is best approached, I will also raise a question about how it is defined. I suggest that the very act of framing issues of government policy in terms of risk regulation reflects certain assumptions about how issues present themselves and what sorts of cognitive processes might be required to address them."

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Emotions, values and the construction of risk /  |c Susan A. Bandes. 
260 |a [Chicago, Ill.] :  |b Law School, University of Chicago,  |c 2008. 
300 |a 1 online resource (29 p.) 
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490 1 |a Public law and legal theory working paper ;  |v no. 221 
500 |a Title from online title page, viewed Dec. 21, 2009. 
500 |a "June 2008." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
520 |a "Dan Kahan's recent article, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, continues a useful exchange between Kahan and Cass Sunstein about the differences between their prominent approaches to risk regulation: Kahan's cultural cognition approach, which inquires into how emotional appraisals of value influence decision making, and Sunstein's heuristics and biases approach, which focuses on the cognitive mechanisms that shape perceptions about risk. A major contribution of Kahan's work has been its insight into the pervasiveness of emotional influences on the decision-making process. The recognition that emotion pervades decision making raises a difficult normative question: how to distinguish the influences that contribute to good judgment from those that distort judgment. This normative question in turn gives rise to a difficult practical question: how to address the influences that cause distortion. In this brief Response, I argue that tackling this evaluative task requires avoiding mirror impulses: emotions should neither be privileged as inherently desirable nor marginalized as inherently irrational. They should be judged based on what they contribute to the cognitive task at hand. The task at hand, as the Kahan/Sunstein debate defines it, is determining how government should regulate risk. In exploring the question of how this task is best approached, I will also raise a question about how it is defined. I suggest that the very act of framing issues of government policy in terms of risk regulation reflects certain assumptions about how issues present themselves and what sorts of cognitive processes might be required to address them." 
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