Review by Choice Review
Zagare's book, an enlightening yet entertaining analysis of deterrence arguments, deserves comparison with Glenn H. Snyder's classic Deterrence and Defense (1961) on several counts. Zagare develops and defines new terms, refines some definitions, and shows how relaxation or rigor in definition alter conclusions; he reconciles some arguments that appeared to conflict in game theory and deterrence theory; his cautious deductive style makes even the more formal aspects of his material accessible to undergraduates; and his real-world applications score higher on the isomorphism test than is usual in this field-they are persuasive, cover a range of crisis events, and include recent cases (e.g., the Falklands). Zagare's book surpasses most treatments of deterrence by emphasizing dynamic elements (including cyclical choice patterns), explicitly accounting for the interdependence of expected utilities in game theoretic contexts, and acknowledging the influence of blackmail arguments advanced by Daniel Ellsberg. The study derives several surprising conclusions, including the positive role occasionally played in containment of international crises by Prisoners' Dilemma gaming, and the use of differential holding power to explain the failure of deterrence instability to yield violent conflict in every instance. A brief but consequential study, recommended for all research, university, and college libraries.-T.C. Smith, Mankato State University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
