Rational association /

Kenneth Arrow proved (Arrow's Theorem) that no social decision procedure, given some plausible background assumptions, could preserve rationality for a group decision even when all members within the group acted rationally. The Prisoner's Dilemma presents a similar divergence in individual and group rationality: doing what is prudent for the individual does not lead to the most beneficial outcome viewed from the perspective of the group. Frohock (political science, Syracuse University) argues that such paradoxical results arise from the theoretical mistake of trying to understand rational associations from the standpoint of individuals. He favors a less atomistic, a less Hobbesian, analysis of corporate decisions. Frohock defends his thesis engagingly with intriguing excursions into the philosophy of language. The book is admirably learned and quite valuable bibliographically; the extensive current literature surrounding the dilemmas of group rationality is presented with an obvious appreciation for the complexity of the subject. Appropriate for upper-division students and above.-C.E. Quest, California State University, Long Beach