Philosophy of criminal law /

Husak asserts that orthodox conceptions of criminal law, effected to a great extent by the utilitarian philosophies of Jeremy Bentham and Oliver Wendell Holmes, require demystification and revision. He contends that the major task confronting criminal theorists is to formulate legal principles that promote social justice without sacrificing their accuracy as descriptions of existing substantive law. Further, Husak states that pervasive conceptions of criminal law influenced by Jerome Hall, John Austin, Glanville Williams, and others have emphasized that modern criminal law is primarily scientific and empirical. Determining the elements of crime has consequently been regarded as a relatively objective enterprise. This has led to a system of criminal law replete with contradictions and inconsistencies. Forming a more enlightened legal theory requires development of a more cohesive philosophical basis for modern substantive law. Husak asserts that liberalism, which he defines as a condition in which the state enforces no particular theory of moral propriety over competitors, represents the tradition that will most effectively facilitate a revised theory of criminal law. Advanced students of law will find this work compelling and provocative.-T.J. Hickey, Lane Community College