Game theory and the humanities : bridging two worlds /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Brams, Steven J.
Imprint:Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2011.
Description:xi, 319 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8363835
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780262015226 (hardcover : alk. paper)
0262015226 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. [295]-309) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1. Game Theory and Literature: An Overview
  • 1.1. Introduction
  • 1.2. Method of Inquiry
  • 1.3. Avoidance and Acceptance of the Minimax Theorem
  • 1.4. Are Zero-Sum Games Emotionless?
  • 1.5. The Rationality of Tragedy
  • 1.6. Coordination Problems, Signaling, and Commitment
  • 1.7. The Devil and God
  • 1.8. Reputation and Intrapsychic Games
  • 1.9. Wherein Lies the Future?
  • 2. The Bible: Sacrifice and Unrequited Love
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. Abraham's Sacrifice
  • 2.3. What If Abraham Had Refused to Sacrifice Isaac?
  • 2.4. Samson and Delilah
  • 2.5. Theory of Moves (TOM)
  • 2.6. Emotions, Feasible Moves, and Morality
  • 3. Theology: Is It Rational to Believe in God?
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. Pascal's Wager and the Search Decision
  • 3.3. The Concern Decision
  • 3.4. The Revelation Game
  • 3.5. Decisions versus Games
  • 4. Philosophy: Paradoxes of Fair Division
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. Criteria and Classification
  • 4.3. Efficiency and Envy-Freeness: They May Be Incompatible
  • 4.4. Unique Efficient and Envy-Free Divisions: Their Incompatibility with Other Criteria
  • 4.5. The Desirability of Unequal Divisions (Sometimes)
  • 4.6. Summary and Conclusions
  • 5. Political Philosophy: How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. Resolution by Voting in a 2-Person PD
  • 5.3. Resolution by Voting in an n-Person PD
  • 5.4. Example of an n-Person PD
  • 5.5. A Biblical Tale
  • 5.6. Other Difficult Games
  • 5.7. Summary and Conclusions
  • 6. Law: Supreme Court Challenges and Jury Selection
  • 6.1. Introduction
  • 6.2. The White House Tapes Case
  • 6.3. Analysis of the White House Tapes Game
  • 6.4. The Roosevelt Court and the New Deal
  • 6.5. Jury Selection
  • 6.6. Summary and Conclusions
  • 7. Plays: Modeling Frustration and Anger
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. The Frustration Game
  • 7.3. Lysistrata: Overcoming Frustration with a Credible Threat
  • 7.4. The Self-Frustration Game
  • 7.5. Macbeth: From Self-Frustration to Murder
  • 7.6. Summary and Conclusions
  • 8. History: Magnanimity after Wars
  • 8.1. Introduction
  • 8.2. The Two-Sidedness Convention
  • 8.3. Different Views on the Rationality of Magnanimity after Wars
  • 8.4. The Magnanimity Game (MG)
  • 8.5. Applications of MG to Historical Cases
  • 8.6. Why Did the Confederacy Initiate the U.S. Civil War?
  • 8.7. Summary and Conclusions
  • 9. Incomplete Information in Literature and History
  • 9.1. Introduction
  • 9.2. Information Revelation in Hamlet
  • 9.3. Incomplete Information in the Magnanimity Game (MG)
  • 9.4. Misperception in the Iran Hostage Crisis
  • 9.5. The Cuban Missile Crisis: Moving, Order, and Threat Power
  • 9.6. Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis
  • 9.7. The Paradox of Omniscience
  • 9.8. Summary and Conclusions
  • 10. Catch-22s in Literature and History
  • 10.1. Introduction
  • 10.2. TOM: Cyclic Games
  • 10.3. Moving Power in TOM
  • 10.4. The Original Catch-22 Game and the Generic Game
  • 10.5. The Witch Trials
  • 10.6. King-of-the-Mountain Games
  • 10.7. Summary and Conclusions
  • 11. Summary and Conclusions
  • Appendix
  • Glossary
  • References
  • Index