Air operations in Israel's war against Hezbollah : learning from Lebanon and getting it right in Gaza /

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Lambeth, Benjamin S.
Imprint:	Santa Monica CA : RAND, 2011.
Description:	xxxiii, 388 p. : ill., maps ; 23 cm.
Language:	English
Series:	RAND Corporation monograph series Rand Corporation monograph series.
Subject:	Hizballah (Lebanon) Israel. -- Ḥel ha-aṿir. Israel. -- Ḥel ha-aṿir. Hizballah (Lebanon) Lebanon War (2006) Lebanon War, 2006 -- Aerial operations, Israeli. Arab-Israeli conflict -- 1993- -- Aerial operations, Israeli. Military operations, Aerial -- Israeli. Lebanon.
Format:	E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8384455

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:	Israel's war against Hezbollah
Other authors / contributors:	Project Air Force (U.S.)
ISBN:	9780833051462 (pbk. : alk. paper) 0833051466 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Notes:	"Prepared for the United States Air Force." "Project Air Force.". "MG-835-AF"--P. [4] of cover. Includes bibliographical references (p. 345-366) and index. Also available online.
Summary:	In response to a surprise incursion by Hezbollah combatants into northern Israel and their abduction of two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a campaign that included the most complex air offensive to have taken place in the history of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Many believe that the inconclusive results of this war represent a "failure of air power." The author demonstrates that this conclusion is an oversimplification of a more complex reality. He assesses the main details associated with the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) campaign against Hezbollah to correct the record regarding what Israeli air power did and did not accomplish (and promise to accomplish) in the course of contributing to that campaign. He considers IAF operations in the larger context of the numerous premises, constraints, and ultimate errors in both military and civilian leadership strategy choice that drove the Israeli government's decisionmaking throughout the counteroffensive. He also examines the IDF's more successful operation against the terrorist organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, to provide points of comparison and contrast in the IDF's conduct of the latter campaign based on lessons learned and assimilated from its earlier combat experience in Lebanon.--Publisher description.

Table of Contents:

Preface
Figures
Tables
Summary
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. Highlights of the Campaign
Initial Reliance on Standoff Attacks
The Standoff War Continues
First Signs of Emerging Doubt
The Move to Ground Operations
Countdown to a Ceasefire
An Inconclusive Ending
Chapter 3. Key Israeli Air Accomplishments
Sustaining a New Battle Rhythm
Defusing the Strategic Rocket Threat
UAV Operations
Airlift and CSAR Support
The Ababil Downings
Chapter 4. Problems in Air Employment
The Intractable Katyusha Challenge
Failed Attempts Against Hezbollah's Leaders
A Polarizing Incidence of Noncombatant Fatalities
Overkill of Lebanon's Infrastructure
Issues in Air-Ground Coordination
Chapter 5. The Winograd Commission's Findings
On the IDF's Combat Performance
On the Olmert Government's Errors in Strategy
On Assessed Leadership Failings
Chapter 6. A Second Chance in Gaza
Getting Ready for the Next Round
An Improved Showing Against Hamas
Highlights of the Joint Operation
Where Israel Got It Right This Time
Chapter 7. The Second Lebanon War Reconsidered
Air Power in IDF Doctrine and Operational Practice
Explaining the Government's Strategy Choice
The Genesis and Execution of the Strategy
Where the Strategy Failed to Deliver
Was the Campaign Really a Lost Cause for Israel?
Chapter 8. Conclusions
Bibliography
Index

Air operations in Israel's war against Hezbollah : learning from Lebanon and getting it right in Gaza /

Similar Items