Causality in the sciences /

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Bibliographic Details
Imprint:Oxford [England] ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011.
Description:xiii, 938 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8391871
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Other authors / contributors:Illari, Phyllis McKay.
Russo, Federica, 1978- Dr.
Williamson, Jon.
ISBN:9780199574131 (acid-free paper)
0199574138 (acid-free paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary:There is a need for integrated thinking about causality, probability, and mechanism in scientific methodology. A panoply of disciplines, ranging from epidemiology and biology through to econometrics and physics, routinely make use of these concepts to infer causal relationships. But each of these disciplines has developed its own methods, where causality and probability often seem to have different understandings, and where the mechanisms involved often look very different. This variegated situation raises the question of whether progress in understanding the tools of causal inference in some sciences can lead to progress in other sciences, or whether the sciences are really using different concepts.
Causality and probability are long-established central concepts in the sciences, with a corresponding philosophical literature examining their problems. The philosophical literature examining the concept of mechanism, on the other hand, is more recent and there has been no clear account of how mechanisms relate to causality and probability. If we are to understand causal inference in the sciences, we need to develop some account of the relationship between causality, probability, and mechanism. This book represents a joint project by philosophers and scientists to tackle this question, and related issues, as they arise in a wide variety of disciplines across the sciences.
Description
Summary:There is a need for integrated thinking about causality, probability and mechanisms in scientific methodology. Causality and probability are long-established central concepts in the sciences, with a corresponding philosophical literature examining their problems. On the other hand, the philosophical literature examining mechanisms is not long-established, and there is no clear idea of how mechanisms relate to causality and probability. But we need some idea if we are to understand causal inference in the sciences: a panoply of disciplines, ranging from epidemiology to biology, from econometrics to physics, routinely make use of probability, statistics, theory and mechanisms to infer causal relationships. These disciplines have developed very different methods, where causality and probability often seem to have different understandings, and where the mechanisms involved often look very different. This variegated situation raises the question of whether the different sciences are really using different concepts, or whether progress in understanding the tools of causal inference in some sciences can lead to progress in other sciences. The book tackles these questions as well as others concerning the use of causality in the sciences.
Physical Description:xiii, 938 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9780199574131
0199574138